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South Africa is poised to expand significantly its nuclear power generation industry. Considering that 
the current South African nuclear safety regulatory approach is applied to regulate the operation 
and maintenance of one mature nuclear power plant, it is expected that significant adaptation of 
this approach will occur for the regulatory system to accommodate the planned industry expansion. 
This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South 
Africa’s planned nuclear industry can already be determined by systematically comparing the 
suitability of various alternatives in use in the international nuclear industry. Investigating the 
validity of this hypothesis improves the understanding of the possibilities available for future nuclear 
safety regulation in South Africa and aids preparations and decision-making in this regard.   
Research was conducted on the various nuclear safety regulatory approaches applied internationally 
and on what determines the suitability of each approach in different circumstances. The 
characteristics of South Africa’s current and planned nuclear power generation industry were 
investigated. Applying multi-criteria decision making analysis methodology, a test was developed 
and used to systematically assess the relative suitability of the various regulatory approaches to the 
South African context. The three primary approaches to nuclear safety regulation considered were 
the prescriptive approach, the performance based approach and the goal-setting approach. Based 
on currently available information, the test results show that the goal-setting regulatory approach is 
the optimal approach for South Africa’s planned nuclear power industry.  
However research findings also show that the state level bilateral cooperation the South African 
government would pursue to develop South Africa’s fleet approach to the 9,6 gigawatt nuclear new 
build programme may have sufficient influence on South Africa’s nuclear industry to change South 
Africa’s optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach or make this plant specific. The benefits of 
aligning South Africa’s nuclear safety regulatory approach with the approach applied in the fleet 
vendor company’s country of origin may outweigh other considerations. The vendor company for 
South Africa’s nuclear new build programme is not yet known.  
Even though systematic comparison of the suitability of various regulatory approaches shows that 
the goal-setting nuclear safety regulatory approach is the optimal approach for South Africa, the 
hypothesis is shown to be false. The optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South Africa’s 
planned nuclear industry cannot already be determined, since bilateral cooperation with the nuclear 
new build fleet vendor company’s country of origin may be the dominant factor in shaping South 
Africa’s nuclear safety regulatory approach.  
In the interim and in the event that strategic regulatory alignment for the new build fleet is not 
embarked upon, the research findings and test results have an important implication: Applying the 
goal-setting approach as the dominant nuclear safety regulatory approach can optimize nuclear 
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1.1 Background: South Africa’s Nuclear Power Generation Industry 
Eskom, the South African power utility, is the owner, operator and maintainer of the only 
commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) on the African continent. Koeberg NPP is a two unit, 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) with each unit having a rated capacity of 0,9 GW electrical. The 
reactor units were designed and built by the French company, Framatome and commissioned in 
1984 and 1985.  The units have a nominal 40 year design life. With ample design margins in hand, 
Eskom is aiming to extend the lifespan to at least 60 years.  
South Africa is poised to expand significantly its nuclear power industry. In 2008 the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME) outlined the government’s vision for the development of an extensive 
nuclear energy programme, stating that the long term goal for South Africa is to be self-sufficient in 
all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as the performance of research and development in the 
field of nuclear energy. The DME further states that South Africa intends on implementing a PWR 
programme applying a fleet approach and on developing an advanced high temperature reactor 
(AHTR) programme. [DME, 2008, pp. 4, 17, 28] In 2011 the Department of Energy (DOE) concluded 
that by 2030 South Africa will require “a nuclear fleet of 9,6 GW” [DOE, 2011, p.6].  
South Africa’s National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is mandated by the National Nuclear Regulator Act 
to “exercise regulatory control related to safety over the siting, design, construction, operation, 
manufacture of component parts, and decontamination, decommissioning and closure of nuclear 
installations” [NNR Act, 1999, s.5(b)]. The objectives of the NNR include providing “for the protection 
of persons, property and the environment against nuclear damage through the establishment of 
safety standards and regulatory practices” [NNR Act, 1999, s.5(a)].  
Within the international nuclear power industry various nuclear safety regulatory approaches are 
utilized, adapted to the need in different countries. In the United States of America (USA) for 
example, nuclear safety regulation follows a prescriptive approach and in the United Kingdom (UK) a 
goal-setting approach is applied.  
In South Africa the NNR currently applies a partially performance based and partially prescriptive 
regulatory approach incorporating process based elements to regulate the safe operation of 






1.2 South Africa’s Nuclear Safety Regulatory Approach in the Light of 
a Growing Nuclear Power Generation Industry 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states that the choice of regulatory approach 
depends on what activities and facilities are to be regulated, the number of different facilities and 
activities requiring regulation and on whether the nuclear technology employed is tried and tested 
or cutting edge. The IAEA further states that the legal framework in which the regulator must 
operate affects the choice in regulatory approach as do the experience, capabilities and resources of 
the regulatory body and the operating organisation. The country’s industrial practices must be taken 
into account, and the regulatory approach selected must promote nuclear safety culture. [IAEA, 
2011, pp.28-32] [IAEA, 2013] 
South Africa’s planned industry expansion includes implementing a fleet approach to PWRs of newer 
technology than that of Koeberg NPP and developing first-of-a-kind nuclear technology. Considering 
the current South African nuclear safety regulatory approach applied to regulate the operation and 
maintenance of one mature NPP, it is expected that significant adaptation of this approach will occur 
for the regulatory system to accommodate the planned expansion. Potential also exists to optimize 
the regulatory approach to maximise efficiency and to review the safety of South Africa’s nuclear 
industry. The future regulatory approach that will be selected by the NNR is not known at this point.  
The IAEA states that a regulator should decide on its regulatory approach after a policy decision on 
whether to launch the nuclear power programme has been taken and when safety infrastructure 
preparatory work for construction of an NPP begins. The decision on approach should be taken and 
its implementation commenced before implementation of the first NPP begins. [IAEA, 2011, pp.2, 
29] For the nuclear new build programme, South Africa currently falls in this phase.  
However Eskom must ensure that it is prepared to participate in and operate under a changing 
nuclear safety regulatory system. It is in Eskom’s interest to develop a robust approach to 
functioning optimally under a potentially different regulatory system and to inform and support the 
NNR in the choice of its future regulatory approach. Improving the understanding of the possibilities 
available and potentially identifying the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South Africa 
will support Eskom’s preparations and its capacity to make relevant decisions in respect of 
operations, skills development and strategic planning. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis  
This dissertation explores the validity of the hypothesis that the optimal nuclear safety regulatory 
approach for South Africa’s planned nuclear industry can already be determined by systematically 





1.4 Research Questions 
Several questions must be considered to facilitate testing of this hypothesis: 
• What are the characteristics of the nuclear power generation industry that South Africa is 
planning for the future?   
• What are the alternative nuclear safety regulatory approaches applied internationally in the 
nuclear power generation industry? 
• What determines the suitability of each approach to different contexts? 
• How does the NNR currently regulate the safe operation of Koeberg NPP and is the current 
approach the most effective approach for Koeberg NPP as it enters long term operation? 
• Should two or more nuclear safety regulatory approaches operate in parallel and why might 
this be beneficial?  
• Can South Africa simply copy a nuclear safety regulation system from a different country 
with an advanced nuclear industry?  
• Considering the South African context, what constraints or limitations exist that would 
exclude certain regulatory approaches from possibly being implemented?  
• How should South Africa adapt its nuclear safety regulatory approach for the planned 
industry expansion if adaptation is required at all?  
• How can South Africa benefit from optimizing its nuclear safety regulatory approach? 
These questions help to define the problem facing the South African Government, the NNR, Eskom, 
and in fact all of the South African nuclear industry’s stakeholders as each organisation determines 
or influences the choice of how best to regulate and manage the safety of South Africa’s changing 
and expanding nuclear power generation industry.  
 
1.5 Scope  
This dissertation concerns nuclear safety regulation of the nuclear power generation industry. The 
conclusions drawn specifically concern the nuclear safety regulation of South Africa’s current and 






1.6 Methodology and Structure  
In order to explore the validity of the hypothesis, a test is developed and implemented to 
systematically compare regulatory approaches and to identify the most suitable approach (or mix of 
approaches) for the South African context. The test applies multi-criteria decision making analysis 
methodology. The following methodology description provides the outline and structure of this 
dissertation.  
Literature Review 
In Chapter 2 the literature review is presented. The literature review aims to determine the extent to 
which the research questions have been answered in existing literature. In order to facilitate testing 
of the hypothesis, the literature review also aims to gather the input information necessary to define 
the characteristics of South Africa’s current and planned nuclear power industry as well as the 
various nuclear safety regulatory approaches applied internationally. The literature review aims to 
identify factors that shape the suitability of the regulatory approaches to differing contexts and to 
identify any constraints that limit the options available for regulatory approaches in South Africa. 
Theory Development 
Based on the input information obtained in the literature review, the options that are available for 
nuclear safety regulatory approaches in South Africa are established in Chapter 3.  
Test parameters are developed in Chapter 3 to represent the South African context and to reflect 
the legal requirements, recommendations and contextual and physical elements that have an 
influence on the optimal regulatory approach for South Africa.  
Test Design 
Following a multi-criteria decision making analysis methodology, a test matrix is developed in 
Chapter 4 which sets the test parameters against the options of regulatory approaches. A scoring 
system is developed to reflect the suitability of each regulatory approach to each test parameter.  
Test Implementation 
In Chapter 5 each test parameter is considered individually. The relative suitability of each regulatory 
approach to the test parameter for the South African context is discussed considering the strengths, 
weaknesses, pros and cons of each regulation system. A basis is developed and used to allocate 
scores indicating relative suitability of each approach to each parameter.  






Test Results, Interpretation and Discussion 
In Chapter 6 the test results are determined and presented. Following multi-criteria decision making 
analysis methodology, for each regulatory approach the summation of the scores allocated for each 
test parameter reveals their relative suitability for the overall South African context.  Important 
factors in the interpretation and analysis of the results are discussed.  
Conclusion 
Taking into account South Africa’s nuclear power generation industry context including legal 
requirements, governance and organisational frameworks, culture and the different role players, 
conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7 on the most suitable, sustainable and efficient nuclear safety 
regulatory approach for South Africa. Conclusions are drawn on the validity of the hypothesis of this 
dissertation.  
Implications of the Research Findings  





2 Literature Review 
In order to compare the suitability of various regulatory approaches, the South African context must 
be understood since the optimal approach is the one that best suits the characteristics of South 
Africa’s planned nuclear power generation industry. A literature review is conducted on the current 
and planned nuclear power generation industry of South Africa. This includes the relevant role 
players, the characteristics of South African nuclear safety culture and the organisational framework 
within which the regulatory body operates, aiming to determine whether any of these may influence 
the optimal regulatory approach. 
Literature review is conducted on the legal requirements applicable to the regulator and the nuclear 
power generation industry as well as on the broader governance frameworks in which the regulator 
must operate in order to identify whether any governance constraints exist that limit the options 
available for regulatory approaches in South Africa. 
Literature review is further conducted to determine what options exist for nuclear safety regulation 
systems by reviewing information on theoretical regulatory approaches and on the regulatory 
approaches implemented in some example countries. Research is conducted into the suitability of 
the regulatory approaches to differing contexts. 
Regulatory lessons learned from major nuclear accidents and from new nuclear build programmes 
are investigated to determine whether these may influence the optimal regulatory approach.   
Testing the hypothesis requires a large amount of input information which is summarized in this 
chapter.  
2.1 Role Players in South Africa’s Nuclear Power Generation Industry 
To determine whether any of the national and international role players or the organisational 
framework within which the NNR operates could influence the optimal regulatory approach, 
research was conducted on the role players involved in 
• decision and law making relating to South Africa’s nuclear power industry undertakings; 
• design and manufacturing of NPP structures, systems and components (SSCs); 
• nuclear power generation; and 
• regulation of electricity and nuclear power. 
The role players identified as having an influence on South Africa’s optimal nuclear safety regulatory 
approach are described following together with a summary of the key findings illustrating the way in 





2.1.1 The Government 
In terms of its IAEA commitments, the South African government needs to fulfil its international 
obligations and promote international cooperation to enhance the global nuclear safety regime 
[IAEA, 2016, p.16]. The features of this regime were reviewed including international conventions, 
codes of conduct and internationally agreed IAEA safety standards.  
The government is to establish the national policy, strategy and laws for nuclear safety to achieve 
this fundamental safety objective: Protect people and the environment from harmful effects of 
ionizing radiation. The government should apply the fundamental safety principles established in the 
IAEA Safety Standard: Safety Fundamentals (SF-1). [IAEA, 2006, p.4] 
As described in IAEA documentation, the government’s role includes legally establishing and 
maintaining a regulatory body and providing it with the resources necessary. The government is 
responsible for ensuring that the regulatory body is effectively independent in its safety related 
decision making. The IAEA further states that the government is to assign the prime responsibility 
for safety to the organization responsible for a nuclear facility or activity and must confer on the 
regulatory body the authority to require these organizations to comply with regulatory requirements 
and to demonstrate their compliance. The government’s IAEA commitments include promoting 
nuclear safety culture. [IAEA, 2016, p.8] 
The 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy states that the South African government pursues bilateral 
cooperation with other states that have nuclear programmes from/with which South Africa can 
learn, benefit, transfer technology or export South African nuclear services and manufactured goods 
[DME, 2008, p.20]. 
2.1.2 The Regulator 
Researchers from the University Network of Excellence in Nuclear Engineering (UNENE) define a 
good regulatory approach as one that has a climate of openness, fairness and high expectations of 
safe performance that operators will internalize. International regulatory trends and approaches 
should be constantly reviewed and considered for adoption and implementation by a national 
regulator. UNENE further emphasizes that the responsibility for safe plant design remains with the 
designer and the responsibility for safe plant operation remains with the operator – these 
responsibilities are not held by the regulator. [UNENE, 2014, p.6] 
The regulatory body, as designated and authorized by government, implements the government’s 
national policy and laws for nuclear safety through establishing a regulatory programme and 
strategy and through establishing or adopting regulations or standards [IAEA, 2016, p.3].  
The regulations should specify the requirements for all stages of the authorization process for 
nuclear facilities and for ensuring adequate protection, providing advance information to the 





In developing regulations and guides, account should be taken of international standards and 
recommendations, obligations imposed by conventions, industrial standards, advances in technology 
and regulations and guides from other countries [IAEA, 2002, p.9]. The regulatory process must 
provide a high degree of confidence that nuclear safety is optimized [IAEA, 2016, p.17]. 
The IAEA requires that regulatory bodies foster mutual understanding and respectful, open and 
formal relationships with licensees/applicants to achieve the common objective of ensuring nuclear 
safety. Although continuous improvement must be emphasized, the IAEA states that the regulator 
must also recognize the risks associated with modifying well established practices. [IAEA, 2016, 
pp.23, 24] 
In South Africa, the NNR was established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No. 47 
of 1999) in order to regulate nuclear activities in South Africa. The NNR Act empowers the regulator 
to grant, amend or revoke nuclear authorisations and installation licences. Key objectives of the NNR 
from the act include providing safety standards and regulatory practices for the protection of 
persons, property and the environment from nuclear damage. [NNR Act, 1999, ss.5(a), 7(1)(a), 27(1)] 
The Nuclear Energy Policy for the Republic of South Africa states that the NNR is responsible for 
ensuring efficient and cost-effective enforcement of compliance with legal requirements and 
internationally benchmarked regulatory requirements. It also states that the NNR will remain the 
responsible regulatory authority for the implementation of South Africa’s planned nuclear industry 
expansion. [DME, 2008, pp.19, 23] 
2.1.3 Nuclear Facility Operator 
The IAEA emphasizes that the organization responsible for a nuclear facility or activity bares the 
prime responsibility for safety; this responsibility cannot be delegated. Mere compliance with 
regulations is not sufficient to demonstrate responsibility for safety. [IAEA, 2016, p.8] 
2.1.4 Eskom 
Eskom Holdings Limited (“Eskom”) is a state owned enterprise, where the government of South 
Africa is the sole shareholder [Eskom, 2017a]. Eskom is the key player in the electricity supply 
industry in South Africa, operating 23 power stations with a total nominal capacity of 42 090MW and 
currently building new power stations, high voltage power lines and distribution networks [Eskom, 
2017b]. Eskom is the owner, operator and maintainer of Koeberg NPP [Eskom, 2017b]. Eskom or its 
subsidiaries has been designated as the procurer for the 9,6 GW nuclear new build programme 






2.1.5 The Vendor 
The vendor will enter into a contract to supply NPP(s) to South Africa. All of the world’s leading NPP 
vendors have developed and voluntarily adopted ‘The Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of 
Conduct’. The Principles of Conduct outline the role that the vendor will play and are briefly 
summarized following.  
The vendor will verify that South Africa, as the customer state, is party to the necessary IAEA and 
United Nations Conventions including the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA’s 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The vendor will verify that the customer 
state has the legislative, regulatory, and organizational infrastructure needed for implementing a 
safe nuclear power programme as advised in the IAEA Safety Standards. [NPP Exporters, 2014] 
The vendor will export NPPs that apply high safety standards and are based on proven, reliable 
technology. The NPPs exported will apply the IAEA suite of Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides, and will meet the regulatory requirements of the customer state. 
The vendor will ensure adequate information exchange with experts of the customer state to adapt 
the NPP design to the local, site-specific conditions and will include design provisions for emergency 
response and security requirements. The vendor will ensure that SSCs are constructed or 
manufactured and installed in accordance with appropriate nuclear standards, and the vendor will 
provide assurance of competent construction management. If the vendor makes use of 
subcontracts, the vendor will only subcontract to companies that have proven their qualifications 
and competence and have been evaluated by the vendor and found to meet the necessary 
requirements. The vendor will ensure that the customer state’s human resources are adequately 
developed for safe, long-term operation, and that all necessary procedures and guidance are 
developed. The vendor will ensure adequate provision of safety documentation and safety analysis 
reports. [NPP Exporters, 2014] 
The vendor will verify that the customer state has enacted national nuclear laws or developed a 
regulatory framework to ensure the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and the 
decommissioning of closed-down nuclear facilities. The vendor will also ensure that the customer 
state has a legal regime in place able to provide prompt compensation to the public with adequate 







2.2 Nuclear Safety Culture in South Africa 
Fundamental information about nuclear safety culture was reviewed primarily from US NRC 
documentation where nuclear safety culture is defined as “the core values and behaviours resulting 
from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals 
to ensure protection of people and the environment” [US NRC, 2016].  
The best information available on South African nuclear safety culture is from the annual ‘Nuclear 
Safety Culture Report for Koeberg Operating Unit’. This report assesses the nuclear safety culture of 
all individuals associated with Koeberg NPP throughout South Africa. “Continuous Learning” and 
“Personal Accountability” are the two strongest South African nuclear safety culture traits. The 
weakest trait is “Respectful Work Environment”. [Eskom, 2017d] 
Continuous Learning Trait: 
The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) defines important elements of this trait as 
“opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought out and implemented” and “nuclear safety is 
kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of monitoring techniques” [WANO, 2013, p.8]. 
Personal Accountability Trait: 
“All individuals take personal responsibility for safety” [WANO, 2013, p.5].  
These two traits have been getting stronger consistently over time [Eskom, 2017d]. 
Respectful Work Environment Trait: 
Anecdotal evidence from observations and discussions identifies that certain factors are evident and 
could contribute to a poor respectful work environment, such as improper implementation of the 
Employment Equity Act, low staff morale, and an unstable organisational structure characterised by 
• leaders performing their tasks in “acting” positions without being formally appointed; 
• suspensions of leaders; 
• frequent leadership changes; 
• skilled staff leaving in large numbers for overseas opportunities;  
• unclear roles and responsibilities; 
• lack of accountability; 
• frequent decision changes, often from outside the Koeberg unit; 
• frequent organisational restructuring; and 
• poor communication.  
Notably, South Africans generally have poor levels of rule compliance. This can be illustrated by, for 
example, Transparency International who ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived 
levels of public sector corruption using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very 
clean. South Africa’s Corruption Perceptions Index score is 43 and South Africa is ranked 71
st
 in the 





An additional example of South Africa’s poor rule compliance in a regulated environment is 
illustrated by the report of the Auditor-General of South Africa for the 2016/2017 financial year. In 
South Africa’s Auditor-General briefing dated 17 October 2017, one of the concerns raised related to 
the challenges faced by the Auditor-General of South Africa. These included threats of litigation by 
entities contesting audit findings, attempts to interfere in audits, personal threats, intimidation and 
delays in providing documentary evidence. Nineteen state-owned enterprises had been audited and 
only five obtained clean audits. Irregular expenditure at state-owned enterprises amounted to 
R2.884 billion. Some state-owned enterprises had outstanding audits due to failure to submit their 
financial statements. Unauthorised expenditure totalling R1.467 billion had been identified in the 
nineteen government departments audited. It was also suggested that language such as “irregular 
expenditure” was being used to cover up theft and fraud. These are just some examples illustrating 
South Africa’s poor rule compliance in a regulated environment from the 2016/2017 financial year 






2.3 South Africa’s Current Nuclear Power Industry 
Eskom is the owner, operator and maintainer of Koeberg NPP, a two unit, three loop PWR. Each unit 
has a rated capacity of 0,9 GW electrical energy. The reactor units were designed and built under a 
turnkey contract primarily by the French company, Framatome under licence from Westinghouse. 
Koeberg unit 1 was commissioned in 1984 and unit 2 in 1985.  [SAR, 2017, p.3] Koeberg is designed 
for a nominal 40 year service life. With adequate design margins, Eskom aims to enter into Koeberg’s 
life extension operational phase in 2025. After at least 20 years in the life extension operational 
phase i.e. in or after 2045, Eskom plans for Koeberg to enter the decommissioning phase. Koeberg 
NPP is a standard, commercial, generation II PWR. 
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), an AHTR, was previously being developed as a project by 
the PBMR (Pty) Ltd. Company in South Africa and  Eskom had the role of customer and future 
operator of the demonstration NPP [Eskom, 2009]. In 2010 the South African government cancelled 
further investment in the project. In 2016 it was announced internally to Eskom that work has 
recommenced on an AHTR project with the aim of building and operating the AHTR as a proof-of-
concept reactor [Reported speech from the Chief Executive Officer of Eskom, personal 
communication, 2016-03-18]. South Africa has a declared intention to pursue a nationally developed 
PBMR Programme subject to success of the first demonstration unit [DME, 2008, p.28]. 
NECSA, holding ASME III N Stamp (Nuclear Design) certification, designs and manufactures ASME III 
nuclear grade components for the world market [NECSA, 2017]. 
The NNR’s Strategic Plan 2017-2021 states that NNR funding is a source of concern and it raises the 
risks of an insufficient number of staff and insufficient skills capacity [NNR, 2017a, pp.17, 21]. 
2.4 South Africa’s Nuclear Power Industry Plans for the Future  
In June 2008 South Africa’s DME published the ‘Nuclear Energy Policy for the Republic of South 
Africa’. Its objectives include promotion of nuclear energy as an important electricity supply option 
and attainment of global leadership and self-sufficiency in the nuclear energy sector [DME, 2008, 
pp.9-10].  
The policy states that all nuclear energy sector activities will take place within a legal regulatory 
framework consistent with international best practice. The policy supports research, development 
and innovation in the use of nuclear technology, including participation in global nuclear energy 
technology innovation programmes. The policy promotes implementation of a fleet approach to 
reactor procurement to optimise the industrialization process and ensure economy of scale. [DME, 
2008, pp.15-17] 
The policy states that nuclear architectural engineering, component manufacturing and construction 
capability will be established to design, manufacture, market, commercialise, sell and export nuclear 





In South Africa’s ‘Policy-Adjusted Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity from 2010 to 2030’ South 
Africa’s DOE concluded that by 2030 South Africa will require a nuclear fleet of 9,6 GW. The plan 
takes into account the costs associated with Generation III NPPs.  [DOE, 2011, p.6] 
South African Government Gazette Notice dated 14 December 2016 states that Eskom Holdings 
(SOC) Limited or its subsidiaries shall be the procurer for the 9,6 GW nuclear new build programme 
[DOE, 2016, ss.1, 4]. 
In an interview published on 18 January 2017, Eskom’s chief nuclear officer Dave Nicholls stated that 
Eskom, or an Eskom subsidiary, has been designated as the owner-operator of the new NPPs. 
Mr. Nicholls explained that Eskom intends on buying a generic NPP that the vendor is already 
building in another country. Eskom aims to secure the rights to build the NPPs itself and to export 
locally manufactured nuclear components and entire NPPs in the future. [Eskom, 2017] 
Eskom released a media statement on 1 February 2017 stating that 27 companies have stated that 
they intend to respond to the Request for Information relating to the proposed nuclear new build 
programme including major nuclear vendors from China, France, Russia and South Korea [Eskom, 
2017c]. 
2.5 Legal Framework for the South African Regulatory Body 
2.5.1 International Legal Framework 
The IAEA, established by the United Nations in 1956, comprises 167 member states and is an 
intergovernmental forum for co-operation in the nuclear field. South Africa became a member in 
1957. [IAEA, 2016a] 
The IAEA states that its member states, under international law, must fulfil their national and 
international undertakings and obligations. Specific legally binding obligations on member states are 
set out in international safety related conventions. To support state implementation of these 
undertakings and obligations, the IAEA states that it publishes internationally agreed nuclear safety 
standards. Although not legally binding, these standards provide a basis for states to demonstrate 
their performance. The IAEA safety standards represent established international consensus 
requirements for the nuclear power industry. [IAEA, 2016, pp.xi, xii]  
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is important in describing the international legal framework in 
which the South African nuclear industry operates. It legally commits member states to maintain a 
high level of safety by setting international benchmarks. The obligations set by the Convention are 
based on the principles contained in the IAEA’s top tier Safety Standard "Fundamental Safety 
Principles (SF-1)". [IAEA, 2017] SF-1 was reviewed and two of the ten safety principles were found to 





Principle 1: ‘Responsibility for Safety’ specifies that the prime responsibility for safety must rest with 
the organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks; this 
responsibility cannot be delegated [IAEA, 2006, p.6]. 
Principle 2: ‘Role of Government’ states that the government is responsible for the establishment of 
an independent regulatory body which must have adequate legal authority, competence and human 
and financial resources to fulfil its responsibilities [IAEA, 2006, p.7]. 
2.5.2 South African Regulatory Body Legal Framework 
The IAEA states that the regulator must prepare its regulations and guides in order to implement the 
laws and policies established by the government [IAEA, 2016, p.3]. For this reason the South African 
government’s nuclear related regulations, notices and policies were reviewed since these, together 
with the NNR Act (Act No. 47 of 1999), form the basis and the minimum scope of the regulations 
that must be developed by the NNR.  
Government regulation R388: “Safety Standards and Regulatory Practices” was found to have an 
influence on the NNR’s approach to regulation. It specifies principal radiation protection and nuclear 
safety requirements including 
• radiation dose limits, 
• risk of fatality limits, 
• optimization of radiation protection and nuclear safety through the application of the as 
low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle, 
• prior safety assessment to identify all significant radiation hazards and risks, 
• application of good engineering practice, 
• fostering and maintaining a nuclear safety culture, 
• regulatory approval of radiation protection and nuclear safety measures, 
• application of defence-in-depth, and 






2.6 Theoretical Nuclear Safety Regulation Systems 
The aim of this portion of the literature review is to determine what options exist for nuclear safety 
regulatory approaches and to identify factors that influence the suitability of the approaches to 
differing contexts. 
2.6.1 Introduction to Nuclear Safety Regulation Systems 
The regulatory approaches currently in use vary significantly from one country to another, 
depending on the size and maturity of the nuclear power programme in the country and on whether 
the country has an NPP vendor or imports NPPs.  The choice of approach should suit the country’s 
political, legal and industrial practices. The approach chosen has a major influence on the required 
number and qualifications of the regulatory staff and on the need for external support for the 
regulator. [IAEA, 2011, pp.30-32]  
The approach chosen should be informed by the regulatory approach implemented in the country 
from where the nuclear technology is being adopted [IAEA, 2013, p.6]. After selection of the NPP 
vendor through the bid evaluation process, the IAEA recommends that the regulatory body 
implement a cooperation programme with the regulatory body of the vendor state and with other 
regulatory bodies that have experience regulating NPPs of the same type and from the same vendor 
as that selected. The IAEA states that there are clear benefits to be gained from this cooperation. For 
example, the technical standards of the vendor state or of a state having experience in regulating 
the type of NPP selected could be accepted for use by the regulator. The regulator can learn and 
benefit from the previously conducted independent analyses and safety assessments performed by 
the other regulators for the type of NPP selected. The other regulatory bodies can provide key 
insights into the quality levels achieved by the manufacturers and suppliers; this information can be 
used by the regulator to optimize its focus on the auditing and evaluating of these organisations. To 
take advantage of these benefits and potentially many more, the IAEA states that the regulator 
should implement a cooperation programme most importantly with the regulator of the vendor 
state and preferably also with the regulators of other states experienced in regulating the same type 
of NPP from the same vendor. The IAEA cautions that this could influence the intended regulatory 
approach tentatively planned before the vendor was chosen.  [IAEA, 2011, pp.21, 35] 
A regulatory system may include prescriptive and non-prescriptive regulations, striking an 
appropriate balance to match the workload that can be accommodated by and the skills of the 
regulator’s staff [IAEA, 2002a, p.12]. 
Regardless of which regulatory approach is applied, the role of the vendor will remain the same: to 
export reliable, proven technology, high safety standard NPPs that apply the IAEA Fundamental 
Safety Principles; are designed in accordance with the IAEA Safety Requirements, with due 
consideration to the relevant IAEA Safety Guides; and that meet the regulatory requirements of the 
customer state [NPP Exporters, 2014]. How the vendor demonstrates that the regulatory 





depend on numerous factors including the regulatory approach applied in the customer state and on 
the regulatory approach applied in the vendor state.  
2.6.2 Prescriptive Regulatory Approach 
Prescriptive regulations clearly set out the regulatory requirements with the entire set of acceptance 
criteria, providing a clear roadmap for compliance to the licensee who must demonstrate that the 
regulatory requirements are met [IAEA, 2013, pp.13, 26]. This approach stresses the importance of 
regulations for safety requiring detailed development and establishing clear, comprehensive 
requirements and expectations which promote systematic interaction between the regulator and 
other parties [IAEA, 2011, p.32]. 
Both the IAEA and the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) provide similar descriptions of 
prescriptive regulations, summarized as follows: The regulations specify the means and method to 
be used to comply with requirements. This results in well-defined licensing rules and a high level of 
regulatory certainty and predictability. Prescriptive regulations are more resource intensive and 
difficult to develop and update; the regulator requires more in depth and specific expert resources. 
Prescriptive regulations are narrowly applicable and require regular updates to remain current with 
technology and situational changes. Prescriptive regulations not kept up to date can end up 
promoting old technology having a negative effect on safety and economics. Prescriptive regulations 
reduce the time and skills necessary to perform a licensing review, to grant an authorization or to 
conduct an inspection since verification of compliance is comparatively easy. The prescriptive 
approach limits the flexibility of the operating organisation in achieving safety. Excessively detailed, 
prescriptive regulatory requirements can inhibit engineering innovation and good management 
initiatives, limiting the licensee’s ability to strive for better performance. Safer means and 
methodologies than those prescribed are discouraged. The prescriptive approach can hinder the 
development of a strong safety culture in the operating organisation. [IAEA, 2002a, p.12] [VTT, 2001, 
s.1.1] 
A highly prescriptive regulatory approach can shift the burden of proof of safety from the designer 
or operator to the regulator. UNENE states that if the designer or operator is required primarily to 
follow detailed rules set by the regulator and if the regulator misses something, part of the 
responsibility for safety has shifted from the designer or operator to the regulator. UNENE further 
states that a prescriptive approach without an integrated risk informed methodology can lead to 
misallocation of resources and regulatory focus towards severe but rare events, as opposed to more 
frequent ones with apparently milder consequences. An integrated risk informed prescriptive 
approach allows for prioritisation of risks, resources and focus. [UNENE, 2014, p.13] 
A prescriptive approach can lead to a minimum compliance attitude and a culture of focussing only 
on rule compliance rather than considering safety. It can lead to an “us and them” relationship 





2.6.3 Performance Based Regulatory Approach  
The IAEA states that in this approach, the regulator prescribes only the basic, high level acceptance 
criteria. It is up to the licensee to set its own specific acceptance criteria and methodologies in order 
to meet the high level acceptance criteria. The regulator requires the licensee to demonstrate that 
criteria are satisfactorily met. This approach allows for fewer and less detailed regulations. [IAEA, 
2013, pp.14, 30] 
The US NRC states that performance based regulations have the following attributes: 
• Measurable, calculable or objectively observable parameters exist to assess or monitor 
performance.  
• Objective criteria to assess performance are established based on risk insights, deterministic 
analyses or performance history.  
• Licensees have flexibility to determine how to meet the established performance criteria in ways 
that encourage and reward improvements. 
• A framework is developed in which failure to meet a performance criterion, while undesirable, 
will not in itself result in an immediate safety concern. [US NRC, 2015] 
The IAEA states that a high level of involvement is required from the operating organisation in 
determining how the regulations will be met. This encourages the operating organisation to own its 
overall responsibility for safety since the operating organisation is clearly responsible for producing 
the detailed level of requirements and the safety demonstrations. [IAEA, 2011, p.32] 
Determining whether measures put in place by the operating organisation are adequate to meet the 
established safety criteria can be challenging and requires effective inter-organisational interaction 
and high level professional competence [IAEA, 2011, p.32]. The regulator must consider how the 
operating organisation interpreted the performance based regulation and judge whether it has been 
fulfilled in a case-specific manner [IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. Performance based regulations are 
comparatively easy to develop, low in administrative burden and have the advantage of not needing 
frequent updates to accommodate new information or technology [IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. 
This approach can sometimes lead to wasted efforts if the operating organisation cannot convince 
the regulator that what has been done is adequate to meet the safety criteria [IAEA, 2013, p.32].  
The flexibility associated with performance based regulations tends to promote continual 
improvement on the part of the operating organisation, as better approaches are constantly sought 
[IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. Performance based regulations can improve the objectivity and transparency of 






2.6.4 Goal-Setting Regulatory Approach 
The regulatory authority or the law sets safety goals and the licensee must demonstrate adequate 
safety in relation to the safety goal [IAEA, 2013, p.15]. 
Examples of high-level numerical safety goals may include goals that are set so that the predicted 
health effects of normal operation and accidents in NPPs are small compared to other social risks 
[UNENE, 2014, p.20]. Examples of safety goals for existing NPPs from the IAEA include targeting a 
frequency of occurrence of severe core damage that is below about 10
–4
 events per plant operating 
year, and a probability of large off-site releases requiring short term off-site response that is below 
about 10
–5
 events per plant operating year [IAEA, 1999, p.11]. 
2.6.5 Risk Based Regulatory Approach 
UNENE states that Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is performed to estimate the risk (the 
likelihood and the consequences) of a large number of failure event sequences on an NPP. In this 
way the different risks posed are numerically quantified and can be ranked in importance. In a 
largely risk based regulatory approach, numerical risk results from PRAs are utilized to focus 
regulatory attention on prioritised risks that present the greatest risk of harm. Risk based goals or 
requirements are set by the regulator and the licensee must demonstrate that the NPP design and 
operating conditions do not exceed the allowable levels of risk. UNENE finds that a risk based 
approach is logical; it quantifies and prioritises risk leaving major design and operating decisions up 
to the licensee, who decides how to meet the risk goals/requirements. This allows a great deal of 
flexibility to the licensee, promoting innovation and evolution. However a risk based approach can 
lead to uncertainty in licensing since the calculation and demonstration of numerical risk can be 
subjective or limited by a lack of knowledge. Some types of failure events and sequences are difficult 
to identify in PRAs resulting in some risk contributors being underestimated. [UNENE, 2014, p.13] 
Wallis explains that, in modern nuclear safety regulation, risk based approaches are being 
incorporated into the traditional deterministic approaches. In traditional, deterministic safety 
regulations, the requirements for design basis accident analysis are specified to include the 
deterministic acceptance criteria and the conservative calculation methods to be applied. One run of 
the analysis code is performed and it is determined whether the acceptance criteria are met. In 
modern nuclear safety regulation, it is becoming increasingly common for analyses to no longer 
focus on the single most penalizing scenario, but instead to include consideration of a wide range of 
scenarios and input assumptions that are varied probabilistically as the analysis code is run a large 
number of times. A range of results is generated with associated probabilities. The results are 
analysed statistically to obtain the required level of confidence that the acceptance criteria would 
not be exceeded. Wallis states that reactor licensees no longer have to show that they meet the 
acceptance criteria based on the results from a calculation of the single most penalizing scenario 





that there is a high level of probability that the acceptance criteria would not be exceeded. [Wallis , 
2006, pp.1586, 1587] 
2.6.6 Process Based Regulatory Approach 
The literature review on theoretical nuclear safety regulatory approaches did not identify any 
information on a process based regulatory approach. Looking outside of nuclear industry related 
sources, some general information defining the process based regulatory approach was found.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) states that process based 
regulations are regulations requiring organisations to develop processes that ensure a systematic 
approach to controlling and minimising risks. OECD explains that process based regulation is based 
on the principle that the organisation will be more effective in identifying hazards and developing 
lowest cost solutions than the regulatory authority. Process based regulation is well suited to 
organisations having multiple and complex sources of risk. In the example discussed by the OECD of 
process based regulation of seafood safety in the USA, the regulated process requires producers to 
analyse the stages of the production process, identify key points at which hazards arise and put in 
place site-specific strategies to manage the hazards. [OECD, 2002, p.136] 
May states that a regulatory approach mandating a process that can be either highly prescriptive or 
defined in terms of the desired outcomes of that process is called a management based regulatory 
approach. May explains that, under the management based regulatory approach, regulated 
organisations establish regulator approved management processes for identifying and correcting 
deficiencies. In this approach, responsibility is placed in the hands of the industry. [May, 2004, pp.2, 
8, 12] 
Coglianese and Lazer state that there exists comparatively little analysis of management based 
regulation as a general regulatory approach. Although little literature exists on the management 
based regulatory approach, it has been implemented in a variety of regulatory contexts around the 
world. This approach compels regulated organisations to improve their internal management. 
Coglianese and Lazer state that typically, under the management based regulatory approach, 
regulatory criteria specify that organisations must develop processes for hazard identification, 
implementing risk mitigation actions, and procedures for monitoring and correcting problems. In 
addition, a process must be established for evaluating and refining the organisation’s management 
with respect to its objective. Management based regulation requires organisations to develop 
processes based on the information they gather and on analysis that they perform. Coglianese and 
Lazer report that this regulatory approach places the responsibility for decision-making with those 
most knowledgeable about the risks and potential control methods. The actions that the 
organisation takes under a management-based approach may therefore be more cost effective and 
successful than under government-imposed regulatory standards. Coglianese and Lazer find that the 
management-based regulatory approach allows the organisation flexibility to experiment and find 





2.7 Country Specific Examples of Nuclear Safety Regulation Systems 
The aim of this portion of the literature review is to further explore the options existing for nuclear 
safety regulatory approaches, how they are implemented in practice and to identify factors 
influencing the suitability of the approaches to differing contexts. For each example country the 
overall regulatory approach was reviewed and a specific application was researched to better 
understand the application of the approach. The specific application considered was how the 
regulatory approach is applied to the case of the acceptance criteria for the design of the Emergency 
Core Cooling System (ECCS). This specific example facilitates a more detailed comparison of the 
regulatory approaches. The characteristics of the nuclear industry regulated in each country were 
briefly reviewed to better understand the country specific context. 
2.7.1 United States of America - a Prescriptive Approach 
The regulatory approach of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is classified by 
the IAEA as a prescriptive approach and is used by the IAEA as a reference example. The IAEA states 
that the NRC has developed its regulatory infrastructure in detail with nuclear safety requirements 
formulated in terms of required systems and plant features for NPPs.  The NRC regulatory literature 
is large and complex, consisting effectively of a long checklist of requirements for safety-related 
SSCs. In the USA compliance with regulatory requirements is deemed to provide reasonable 
assurance of adequate protection. [IAEA, 2013, pp.18, 19]  
The regulations are highly prescriptive and provide explicit acceptance criteria [UNENE, 2014, p.25]. 
NRC Regulations Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations section 50.46: “Acceptance Criteria for 
Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors” includes: 
“(a)(1)(i) Each boiling or pressurized light-water nuclear power reactor fuelled with uranium oxide 
pellets within cylindrical zircaloy or ZIRLO cladding must be provided with an emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS) that must be designed so that its calculated cooling performance following postulated 
loss-of-coolant accidents conforms to the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this section.” 
“(b)(1) Peak cladding temperature. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature 
shall not exceed 2200° F. 
(2) Maximum cladding oxidation. The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shall nowhere exceed 
0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation.  
(3) Maximum hydrogen generation. The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the 
chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical 
amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, 
excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react” [US NRC, 2007]. 
The NRC states that historically it relied on prescriptive regulations that specified a rigid solution to a 
licensee on how to achieve a safety objective. The NRC states it employed a deterministic analysis 
approach coupled with a defence-in-depth approach where regulators postulated what they 





consequences. The NRC created regulations enforcing requirements for redundant safety features 
that could prevent or mitigate the deterministically identified consequences. [US NRC, 2010, pp.70-
73] 
Wallis explains that the traditional safety regulations of the US NRC specify certain physical limits, 
such as the peak clad temperature, which shall not be exceeded in a design basis accident. These 
regulations describe conservative calculation methods and specify deterministic acceptance criteria 
to be applied in the design basis accident analysis. The analysis code produces a single set of results 
and one run of the code is performed. The results are then compared with the acceptance criteria. 
[Wallis , 2006, p.1586] 
This approach did not allow for effective prioritization of accident scenarios and it did not allow for 
effective judgment to be made as to whether the cost of additional safety measures produced a 
commensurate increase in safety margins. In 1994 it was concluded that the NRC’s practices 
threatened America’s nuclear power generation industry by making its pricing non-competitive. It 
was recommended that the NRC place greater emphasis on performance based regulation, allowing 
licensees flexibility in determining how to accomplish regulatory objectives. In 1995 the NRC 
adopted a policy encouraging broad application of PRA to optimise decision making on safety issues 
and to reduce unnecessary burdens on licensees. The NRC policy still maintained the deterministic 
and defence-in-depth based approaches as the highest order approaches, but it specified that the 
insights provided by PRA should be used to identify overly conservative regulatory requirements. [US 
NRC, 2010, pp.70-73] 
The NRC today still maintains most of its original prescriptive regulations. Risk informed 
performance based regulations are being developed and implemented in an incremental, phased 
approach. [US NRC, 2016a] 
The NRC states that it uses a risk informed regulatory approach to identify additional regulatory 
requirements where needed and to reduce unnecessary requirements created under the traditional 
deterministic approach. The NRC applies performance based regulation by setting a requirement for 
licensees to achieve a desired outcome without direction regarding how that outcome is to be 
obtained. The NRC states that its performance based regulations focus on identifying performance 
measures that ensure adequate safety margins and offer incentives to licensees to improve safety 
without regulatory intervention. [US NRC, 2016b] 
As an example, Dey states that in 1992, the US NRC began a major initiative to develop requirements 
for containment testing that are less prescriptive and more performance oriented and risk informed 
than current requirements. This action was a result of findings that the economic burden of certain 
containment testing requirements was not commensurate with their safety benefits. Probabilistic 
risk assessment of reactor accident risks showed that the allowed containment leak rate could be 
increased without significantly affecting the accident risk. This could justify relaxing the allowable 





rate tests from three every 10 years to one every 10 years would to lead to an undetectable increase 
in risk. This could justify increasing the interval for the containment leak rate test. In addition, 
analyses of operational experience data showed that establishing intervals for the containment local 
leak rate tests on the basis of the performance of containment isolation valves and penetrations 
would have a marginal impact on safety. In this performance based regulatory approach, valves and 
penetrations that perform well would be tested less frequently. [Dey, 1996] 
Dey showed that, for the example of containment testing, when the NRC finalized its performance-
oriented, risk-informed revision to its containment testing requirements, a resulting cost saving of 
approximately 70% of the remaining costs of the new US NRC requirements was achieved [Dey, 
1996, p.308].  
The NRC states that it does not indorse a risk based regulatory approach where decision making is 
based solely on PRA numerical results due to uncertainties associated with PRA. In contrast, risk 
informed regulation considers risk insights together with other factors to establish regulatory 
requirements. This risk informed approach enhances the traditional, deterministic approach.  [US 
NRC, 1999, p.3] 
In spite of efforts to move towards risk informed performance based regulations, the current suite of 
the NRC’s regulatory documentation is large, detailed and complex with a great number of 
regulatory requirements [IAEA, 2013, p.18].  
The USA has 99 reactors operated by 30 power companies. There are 65 PWRs and 34 boiling water 
reactors. There are 4 reactors currently under construction, applying Westinghouse design 
technology. Additional reactors are planned for construction. Nuclear reactors are designed in the 
USA. The USA is an exporter of nuclear technology. [WNA, 2016a] 
2.7.2 United Kingdom - a Goal-Setting Approach 
The regulatory approach of the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is classified by the IAEA as a 
goal-setting approach and is used by the IAEA as a reference example.  
The UK’s Health and Safety at Work etc Act of 1974 sets overall safety goals: 
• Employers are to ensure the health, safety and welfare of their employees as far as is 
reasonably practicable. 
• Risks to the health and safety of those not in their employ are to be reduced as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP).  
• Designers, importers and manufacturers are to ensure as far as reasonably practicable that 
use of their equipment will not cause risks to the health and safety of the users. 
[UK Government, 2018, s.6(1)(a)] 
The ONR states that the fundamental requirement is for risks to be reduced ALARP. This is 





licensee to implement safety measures to the point where the costs of any additional measures 
would be grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction that would be achieved. [ONR, 2015, p.11] 
The ONR states that its risk acceptance policy is quantified through set numerical goals. These goals 
assist the ONR staff in judging whether radiological hazards are being adequately controlled and 
whether risks have been reduced ALARP. The goals assist regulatory staff in targeting resources to 
where the risks are greatest. In assessing safety, inspectors judge the extent to which the goals are 
achieved. Some goals are in the form of dose levels; others are expressed as frequencies or risks. 
Numerical radiological dose risk goals are set for normal operational, design basis fault and 
radiological accident risks to people on and off the site. These are included in the Safety Assessment 
Principles (SAPs) used by the ONR to judge the adequacy of safety of a licence application. [ONR, 
2014, pp.150-152] Two important risk levels are defined: 
Basic Safety Level:  
This risk level marks the boundary between the “unacceptable risk” region and the “tolerable risk” 
region. Where risk exceeds the Basic Safety Level, consideration should be given to shut down the 
facility or prohibit the activity. [ONR, 2014, pp.150-152] 
Basic Safety Objective:  
This risk level marks the boundary between the “tolerable risk” region and the “broadly acceptable 
risk” region. The Basic Safety Objectives form benchmarks that reflect modern safety standards and 
expectations. The Basic Safety Objectives also indicate a level beyond which further consideration of 
safety would not be a reasonable use of ONR resources. ALARP considerations may be such that the 
applicant/licensee is justified in stopping before reaching the Basic Safety Objective, but if it is 
reasonably practicable to provide a higher standard of safety then the applicant/licensee must do so 
by law. [ONR, 2014, pp.150-152] 
The ONR states that licensees must demonstrate that they have done everything reasonably 
practicable to reduce risks by balancing the level of risk posed by their activities against the 
measures required to control that risk in terms of money, time or effort. The operating organisation 
is afforded the flexibility required to be innovative and to adopt practices that best meet its 
particular circumstances, encouraging continuous improvement. [ONR, 2016, p.17] 
The characteristics of this approach include ensuring that outcomes are cost effective and without 
unnecessary burden as well as not being unduly risk averse [ONR, 2016b, pp.8, 9]. 
Williams, Potter and Harbison state that in the UK’s non-prescriptive regulatory approach, the 
licensee is free to propose any means to achieve the required level of safety but the licensee must 
clearly and comprehensively demonstrate that the proposals are adequate. This is achieved through 
the safety case which demonstrates the safety adequacy the proposals. The safety case must 
describe the safety concepts, supporting research and the resulting design criteria. The safety case 





The ONR’s regulatory approach is underpinned by safety case assessments with the safety cases 
themselves being produced by the licensees [ONR, 2016, p.18]. 
The ONR states that a safety case is the totality of documented information, arguments and 
justifications developed by the licensee that substantiates the safety of the NPP, activity, operation 
or modification in question. A safety case provides a written demonstration that the relevant 
standards have been applied and that risks have been reduced ALARP, providing a clear and 
comprehensive demonstration that a facility can be operated or an activity can be undertaken 
safely. [ONR, 2016a, pp.5, 6] 
The ONR assesses each safety case independently to reach a judgement on the adequacy of the 
safety case based on the overriding requirement that the safety case shows that the licensee has 
reduced risks ALARP [ONR, 2016, p.18]. The SAPs are used to support regulatory assessment of 
safety cases [ONR, 2015, p.17]. SAPs are guidance for ONR inspectors to facilitate consistent 
regulatory judgements; they are not mandatory requirements for licensees [ONR, 2014, p.7].  Safety 
cases are also assessed against the numerical risk goals [ONR, 2014, p.7]. In applying the SAPs, 
priority is given to achieving an overall balance of safety rather than satisfying each principle or 
making an ALARP judgement against each principle [ONR, 2016d, p.36]. 
It is the responsibility of the licensee to demonstrate and deliver nuclear safety [ONR, 2016c, p.12]. 
Specifically concerning the ECCS design, the relevant SAPs include: 
• “Structures, systems and components that are important to safety should be designed, 
manufactured, constructed, installed, commissioned, quality assured, maintained, tested 
and inspected to the appropriate codes and standards” [ONR, 2014, p.42]. 
• “The extent of safety system provisions, their functions, levels of protection necessary to 
achieve defence-in-depth and reliability requirements should be specified” [ONR, 2014, 
p.91]. 
• “All Class 1 protection systems should employ diversity in their detection of and response to 
fault conditions, preferably by the use of different variables” [ONR, 2014, p.92]. 
•  “The design of safety systems should avoid complexity, apply a failsafe approach and 
incorporate means of revealing internal faults at the time of their occurrence” [ONR, 2014, 
p.95]. 
• “In determining the safety systems to be provided, allowance should be made for the 
potential unavailability of equipment” [ONR, 2014, p.96]. 
The ONR regulates 37 nuclear sites including a PWR, advanced gas cooled reactors, a research 
reactor and decommissioning sites [ONR, 2017]. The ONR regulates the design and construction of 





2.7.3 Finland - a Performance Based Approach 
The regulatory approach followed by Finland’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is 
classified by the IAEA as a performance based approach and is used by the IAEA as a reference 
example. The IAEA states that STUK sets high level acceptance criteria and does not define any 
specific method to meet these criteria. STUK allows the licensee full flexibility in determining how 
specific requirements are to be met and the licensee must adequately demonstrate that the 
requirements have been met. [IAEA, 2013, p.22] 
VTT states that Finnish legislation gives the licence holder full responsibility for safety of the NPP.  
STUK issues regulations, sets detailed requirements for licensed operation and monitors plant 
operation. STUK’s regulations clearly state the safety criteria, against which alternative solutions 
developed by the licensee can be judged by the regulator. As far as possible, the safety criteria and 
requirements specified are independent of specific technical solutions. [VTT, 2001, ss.2.1, 3.1, 3.3] 
STUK’s regulatory documentation is divided into two sections: Regulations and Regulatory Guides. 
[STUK, 2017] There is only one relevant regulation: “Regulation on the Safety of a Nuclear Power 
Plant” (STUK Y/1/2016). This regulation was reviewed; it is brief, providing high level acceptance 
criteria.  
STUK publishes numerous YVL Guides effectively forming the actual regulatory system. STUK 
describes the rules for application of the guides, stating that the safety requirements are binding on 
the licensee while preserving the licensee's right to propose an alternative procedure or solution to 
that provided for in the regulations. If the licensee can convincingly demonstrate that its proposed 
procedure or solution will implement the required safety level, STUK may approve this different 
procedure or solution. [STUK, 2017a] Although the regulatory system allows for these deviations, in 
practice, solutions different to those normally implemented present a regulatory approval challenge 
since it may be difficult for the regulator to review and approve the associated specific safety case 
presenting unfamiliar arguments and analyses [VTT, 2001, s.3.3]. 
STUK requires that applicants/licensees keep an up-to-date PRA. Risk limits are defined. STUK 
requires that the design, construction and operation of an NPP be managed in a risk-informed 
manner so that safety is always prioritised. [STUK, 2013b] 
In its assessment of the YVL-guides, VTT found that there are a number of cases where the guides 
are more prescriptive than desired by the overall Finish regulatory approach. It was found that 
STUK’s regulations sometimes differ from international standard practices, making compliance with 
these regulations challenging for international vendors and suppliers. This results in difficulty in 
finding vendors and suppliers willing to make the changes necessary to meet the local regulatory 
requirements, higher prices, re-engineering and re-documentation work and increased time 





from inspecting technical details and towards inspecting and reviewing the work processes of the 
licensees. [VTT, 2001, s.6.5] 
STUK’s periodic inspection programme is focused on the licensee’s main working processes [STUK, 
2013, p.22]. 
Considering the example of the acceptance criteria for the ECCS design, the following extracts from 
STUK Regulation Y/1/2016 illustrate STUK’s approach: 
“Nuclear power plant safety and the technical solutions of its safety systems shall be assessed and 
substantiated analytically and, if necessary, experimentally” [STUK, 2015, p.4]. 
“In order to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences thereof, a nuclear power plant shall 
be provided with systems for shutting down the reactor and maintaining it in a sub-critical state, for 
removing decay heat generated in the reactor, and for retaining radioactive materials within the 
plant. Design of such systems shall apply redundancy, separation and diversity principles that ensure 
implementation of a safety function even in the event of malfunctions” [STUK, 2015, p.7]. 
“The most important safety functions necessary to bring the plant to a controlled state and to 
maintain it must be ensured even if any individual component of a system providing the safety 
function is inoperable and even if any other component of a system providing the same safety 
function or of a supporting or auxiliary system necessary for its operation is simultaneously 
inoperable due to the necessity for its repair or maintenance” [STUK, 2015, p.7]. 
“Common cause failures shall only have minor impacts on plant safety” [STUK, 2015, p.7]. 
STUK’s Guide YVL B.1 titled “Safety Design of a Nuclear Power Plant” includes the following 
statements relating to ECCS acceptance criteria: 
“5108. An emergency core cooling system shall be provided to cope with coolant leaks in the 
primary circuit and the systems directly associated with it; it shall compensate for any loss of coolant 
or otherwise provide efficient reactor cooling in order to ensure that the design limits for fuel are 
not exceeded. 
5109. The capacity of the emergency core cooling system shall be adequate to compensate for leaks 
of various magnitudes, with the largest postulated leak equalling the complete, instantaneous break 
of the largest primary circuit pipe. 
5110. The operability and efficiency of emergency core cooling under postulated leak conditions 
shall be ensured through appropriate primary circuit configuration and the positioning of the 
emergency core cooling connections” [STUK, 2013a, p.19]. 
Finland has four reactors in operation, all supplied by foreign countries. A fifth foreign supplied 





construction and additional foreign supplied reactor units are in the planning stages. Finland does 
not design and build nuclear reactors. [WNA, 2016] The utilities are dependent on international 
vendors and suppliers.  
2.7.4 Canada - A Risk Informed, Moderately Prescriptive Approach 
UNENE states that Canada implements a mixed approach to nuclear safety regulation, using risk 
based and prescriptive approaches. The prescriptive approach offers defence against accidents not 
well identified through PRA. The risk based approach ensures that the regulator’s attention is 
focused on the highest priority risks, minimising misallocation of resources to truly rare low-risk 
events. Canada’s approach is less prescriptive than that of the USA. [UNENE, 2014, p.13] 
The regulatory document ‘Physical Design: Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants’ 
published by the Canadian regulatory authority, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), was 
reviewed. It comprehensively sets out requirements and guidance for new NPP licence applications 
that promote defence-in-depth, are risk informed and aligned with accepted international codes and 
practices. To the extent practicable, the requirements and guidance are technology-neutral. This 
document states: “An applicant or licensee may put forward a case to demonstrate that the intent of 
a requirement is addressed by other means and demonstrated with supportable evidence” [CNSC, 
2014, p.i]. The CNSC prescribes high level criteria for the design of reactor facilities, including 
acceptable core damage and release frequencies. [CNSC, 2014, pp.4-5] 
Considering the example of the acceptance criteria for the ECCS design, CNSC’s requirements are 
stated less prescriptively than in the US NRC’s approach, and it is up to the designer to justify how 
the acceptance criteria are met [UNENE, 2014, p.25]. The following is an extract from CNSC’s 
‘Physical Design: Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants’: 
“The ECCS shall meet the following criteria for all DBAs [Design Basis Accidents] involving loss of 
coolant: 
1. All fuel assemblies and components in the reactor shall be kept in a configuration such 
that continued removal of the residual heat produced by the fuel can be maintained. 
2. A continued cooling flow (recovery flow) shall be supplied to prevent further damage to 
the fuel after adequate cooling of the fuel is re-established by the ECCS. 
The ECCS recovery flow path shall be such that impediment to the recovery of coolant following a 
loss of coolant accident by debris or other material is avoided. 
The design shall ensure that maintenance and reliability testing can be carried out without a 
reduction in the effectiveness of the system below the OLCs [operational limits and conditions], if 





Canada has developed its own range of NPPs and is a long-time leader in nuclear energy research 
and development. There are 19 reactors in Canada. Canada is an exporter of reactor systems. [WNA, 
2016b] 
2.7.5 South Africa – a Mixed Regulatory Approach 
The NNR states that historically, it adopted a non-prescriptive regulatory approach where it set 
largely risk based overall safety criteria and the applicant had to submit a safety case demonstrating 
safety in respect to the overall safety criteria. The conditions contained in the approved safety cases 
became conditions contained in the nuclear authorisations granted by the NNR i.e. licence 
conditions. Licensee standards, specifications and even procedures were also adopted in a similar 
manner, resulting in a prescriptive approach but with the detailed requirements being originally 
established by the licensee. In the early 2000’s, the NNR moved towards process based licensing for 
Koeberg NPP. In this approach, in addition to its principal licensing criteria (radiological dose risk 
limits) and conditions of the licence, the NNR requires that the licensee complies with certain high 
level process requirements that have been established by the licensee and approved by the NNR. 
[NNR, 2016, pp.3, 4, 10] A key enabler for this approach is the safety evaluation process, used by the 
licensee for evaluation of any proposed safety related changes to the plant or its safety basis.  
In applying process based licensing, the NNR states that it places the onus on licensees’ processes, 
competencies and self-assessments to manage nuclear safety. These requirements include 
generating and updating safety cases and detailed procedures. The NNR monitors the 
implementation of these processes through surveillances and audits. [Personal communication, 
NNR, 2017] 
The NNR emphasizes that the ultimate responsibility for the safety of a nuclear facility rests with the 
applicant or operating organization. An advantage of process based regulation is that the 
responsibility for technical, detailed aspects of nuclear safety is more clearly placed in the hands of 
the licensee. The NNR notes that the extent to which process based licensing should be 
implemented depends on the maturity and robustness of the licensee’s processes. For certain 
applications a prescriptive approach might be more appropriate. [Personal communication, NNR, 
2017] 
The NNR, as the need arises, provides directives to the licensee or applicant on the manner in which 
compliance with a given requirement or authorisation condition can be satisfied. In such cases the 
manner of compliance prescribed by the NNR is the only way deemed adequate to ensure 
compliance with the requirement.  [Personal communication, NNR, 2017] Prescriptive regulatory 
requirements are thus specified.  
The NNR has published requirements on risk assessment for nuclear installations and requires that 
nuclear installations comply with its principal safety criteria. These refer to limits on the risk of 





conditions. The NNR does not prescribe how compliance with the principal safety criteria must be 
achieved and maintained. [NNR, 2008]   
The radiological dose and risk limits for the public and workers are considered by the NNR to be the 
most fundamental measures for assessing nuclear safety. Their utilization contributes towards a 
consistent and transparent basis for regulatory decision making.  [NNR, 2017b] 
The NNR’s safety standards describe principal safety requirements including defence-in-depth, 
ALARA, good engineering practice, quality management, safety culture and the application of a 
graded approach. The NNR requires that protection be optimized to provide the highest level of 
nuclear safety that can reasonably be achieved, in accordance with the ALARA principle. All practical 
efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents. Robust safety case 
development is required. [NNR, 2017b] 
As part of the process for licensing a new nuclear installation, the NNR requires that the applicant 
produce a safety case for each licensing stage [NNR, 2002, p.3]. The safety case must demonstrate 
that the facility or activity is capable of meeting the NNR prescribed limits for radioactive releases 
and radiation doses, and that the principles of ALARA, defence-in-depth and others have been 
applied [Personal communication, NNR, 2017]. The NNR draws up a licence for a facility or activity 
that encompasses the requirements, provisions and undertakings identified within the safety case. 
The NNR then implements a compliance inspection and audit programme.  [NNR, 2002, p.10] 
The NNR therefore implements a mixed nuclear safety regulatory approach, including elements of 






2.8 Regulatory Lessons Learned from Major Nuclear Accidents  
2.8.1 Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident (1979) 
UNENE reported that the accident investigation found the U.S. regulations were too voluminous and 
complex, requiring immense effort for compliance. The regulations equated compliance with safety. 
There was no requirement to look beyond the limited, single component failure events specified by 
the NRC to be taken into account in NPP design. Subsequent to this accident, insights from PRAs 
were used more widely to reveal severe accident vulnerabilities and to identify regulatory 
requirements that attracted disproportionately high resources compared to the risk they mitigated. 
[UNENE, 2014, p.14] 
2.8.2 Chernobyl Nuclear Accident (1986) 
Investigation revealed that the NPP design violated the existing safety regulations but was 
nevertheless approved by the relevant authorities. It was reported that staff lacked an adequate 
nuclear safety culture and regulatory authorities were found to be lax in bringing plants into line 
with the safety standards and regulations. [Commission to SCSSINP, 1991, pp.10, 50]  
The operating organization did not have ultimate responsibility for safety [UNENE, 2014, p.15].  
It was also found that the regulatory regime was ineffective in developing and enforcing 
requirements. It did not function as an independent organisation and it was unable to counter 
production pressures. [IAEA, 1992, p.21] 
2.8.3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident (2011) 
UNENE states that the inadequacy of the design of the NPP was known to the utility and the 
regulator before the accident but was not acted on. The regulator lacked separation from the utility. 
[UNENE, 2014, p.14] 
The regulator had a negative attitude towards the importation of new knowledge and technology 
from overseas. In addition the regulatory body was created as part of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, an organization that promoted nuclear power. [NAIIC, 2012, pp.16, 17] 
2.9 Nuclear Regulatory Lesson Learned from New Build Experience 
This literature review revealed one key finding from the cost and schedule overruns occurring at the 
reactor construction at Olkiluoto, Finland. The operator, TVO, and the vendor, AREVA, state that one 
of the root causes is the evolution of Finnish regulations during the construction process introducing 






3 Theory Development 
The following theory development is necessary to test the hypothesis utilizing multi-criteria decision 
making analysis: 
• Identify the objectives of the analysis. 
• Identify the available options for achieving the objectives. 
• Identify the test parameters for comparison of the available options. 
The information obtained from the literature review and summarized in Chapter 2 forms the basis of 
this theory development. 
3.1 Objectives of the Analysis  
The objective of the multi-criteria decision making analysis is to determine the optimal nuclear 
safety regulatory approach for South Africa’s envisioned nuclear power generation industry. The 
optimal approach for South Africa is the one that is best suited to regulating the following nuclear 
power generation industry as determined by the literature review 
• a generation II, standard technology PWR NPP in service since 1984, entering its life 
extension operational phase in 2025 and owned, operated and maintained by Eskom [SAR, 
2017, p.3]; 
• research and development of a prototype AHTR by Eskom [Reported speech from the Chief 
Executive Officer of Eskom, personal communication, 2016-03-18] supported by [DME, 2008, 
p.28];  
• a nuclear new build programme to construct a fleet of generation III PWR NPPs totalling 
9,6 GW with Eskom being the designated procurer working with a vendor company [DOE, 
2011, p.6] [DOE, 2016, ss.1, 4]; and 
• the establishment of a national capability for the design, manufacture, construction and 
export of nuclear energy SSCs and services [DME, 2008, p.24]. 
3.2 Available Options for Achieving the Objectives 
The literature review on nuclear safety regulatory approaches applied in the nuclear industry 
internationally identified the goal-setting, performance based, prescriptive, process based and risk 
based approaches.  
Although purely risk based regulation is sometimes considered as a regulatory approach in its own 
right, it is normally applied as a supporting methodology to other approaches. Similarly, process 
based regulation is also applied as a supporting methodology to other approaches. These two 
supporting methodologies are not recognized by the IAEA as regulatory approaches. 
The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety legally commits member states to maintain a high level of 





IAEA warns that the regulator must recognize the risks associated with modifying well established 
practices [IAEA, 2016, p.24]. South Africa, as an IAEA member state, is subject to legally binding 
obligations set out in international safety related conventions and supported by internationally 
agreed IAEA nuclear safety standards representing established international consensus 
requirements for the nuclear industry [IAEA, 2016, pp.xi, xii].  
The South African government requires that international best practice be followed for the legal 
nuclear regulatory framework and the government emphasizes the importance of applying 
internationally benchmarked regulatory requirements [DME, 2008, pp.15, 19]. This shows the 
government’s policy intent of applying internationally benchmarked, best practices which is what 
the IAEA standards represent. 
For these reasons only established regulatory approaches applied in the international nuclear power 
industry and endorsed by the IAEA are considered to be options available for South Africa.  
Purely risk based and purely process based regulatory approaches are therefore not considered to 
be options for nuclear regulatory approaches in South Africa, although these may add value when 
applied as supporting methodologies.  
In addition since only established regulatory approaches applied in the international nuclear power 
industry and endorsed by the IAEA are considered to be options available for South Africa, 
development of a regulatory approach that is new to the nuclear industry should not be considered 
as an option for South Africa. 
3.3 Test Parameters for Comparison of the Available Options 
During the literature review, the literature was scrutinized to identify requirements, 
recommendations or contextual or physical elements that have an influence on the optimal 
regulatory approach for South Africa.  
The test parameters are selected to represent the South African context. They represent the factors 
identified through the literature review as having an influence on South Africa’s optimal regulatory 
approach. The parameters represent the international and national legal requirements for nuclear 
safety regulation that are applicable to South Africa and that have an influence on the optimal 
regulatory approach. The test parameters reflect the South African government’s policy decisions 
that have an influence on the optimal regulatory approach. They reflect influential 
recommendations identified in the literature review concerning qualities that a good regulatory 
approach should promote. The test parameters represent the influential characteristics of the 
nuclear industry environment in South Africa. They represent the physical elements of the nuclear 
industry that South Africa has in place and is aspiring to develop.  
As literature was reviewed a list of these requirements, recommendations and contextual and 





generated. Duplicate items were then removed. The fifteen test parameters described below 
represent and envelop all of the factors identified in the literature review that may have an influence 
on South Africa’s optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach. These parameters have been selected 
to facilitate assessing the relative suitability of the identified regulatory approaches to the South 
African context. For each parameter listed below key statements from the literature review as 
summarized in Chapter 2 are presented, explaining the basis for the identified parameter.  
Parameter 1: Alignment with Internationally Agreed IAEA Safety Standards 
South Africa, as an IAEA member state, has an obligation under international law to fulfil its 
international undertakings and obligations. To support state implementation of these, the IAEA 
publishes internationally agreed but not legally binding safety standards which provide a basis for 
states to demonstrate their performance in fulfilling their obligations. [IAEA, 2016, p.xi]  
The South African government requires that international best practice be followed for the legal 
nuclear regulatory framework and that regulatory requirements be internationally benchmarked 
[DME, 2008, pp.15, 19]. This demonstrates the government’s policy intent of applying internationally 
benchmarked, best practices which is what the IAEA standards represent.  
All of the world’s leading NPP vendors have adopted ‘The Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles 
of Conduct’ which apply the IAEA suite of documentation: the Conventions, the Fundamental Safety 
Principles, the Safety Requirements and the Safety Guides [NPP Exporters, 2014].  
In addition, UNENE recommends that international regulatory trends and approaches be constantly 
reviewed and considered for adoption and implementation by a national regulator [UNENE, 2014, 
p.6].   
Parameter 2: Financial and Human Resource Suitability  
The regulatory approach chosen will have a major influence on the size, structure and resources 
needed by the regulatory body including on the number and qualifications of the regulatory staff 
and on the need for external support for the regulatory body [IAEA, 2011, pp.29, 31]. 
The IAEA states that the government provides the regulatory body with the necessary resources and 
competence [IAEA, 2016, p.6]. South Africa’s Nuclear Energy Policy states that the government is 
responsible for establishing the regulatory body and that the NNR is responsible for efficient and 
cost-effective regulation [DME, 2008, pp.18, 19]. 
The NNR’s funding is limited. State grants have been reduced and there are limitations on income 
that can be generated through fees increases on nuclear authorisations [NNR, 2017a].  
Financial and human resource suitability represents a characteristic of the nuclear industry 






Parameter 3: Cultural Suitability 
The literature review on the safety culture of Eskom and its contractors revealed that the South 
African nuclear safety culture is characterised by individuals taking personal responsibility for safety, 
continuously learning and keeping nuclear safety under constant scrutiny. Trust and respect are 
cultural weaknesses. [Eskom, 2017d] An additional cultural weakness is rule compliance 
[Transparency International, 2017] [PMG, 2017]. 
Cultural suitability represents a characteristic of the nuclear industry environment in South Africa 
having an influence on the optimal regulatory approach. 
Parameter 4: Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture  
The IAEA requires that governments promote nuclear safety culture [IAEA, 2016, p.4]. Fostering and 
maintaining a nuclear safety culture is also a national legal requirement in South Africa [DME, 2006, 
s.3.5]. The literature review revealed that a lack of nuclear safety culture contributed to the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident [Commission to SCSSINP, 1991, p.10]. 
This parameter represents a legal requirement. 
Parameter 5: Suitability for Ensuring Responsibility for Nuclear Safety is Held 
by those Responsible for the Facilities and Activities 
Principle 1 of the IAEA’s top tier Safety Standard "Fundamental Safety Principles” states that the 
prime responsibility for safety must rest with the organization responsible for facilities and activities 
that give rise to radiation risks [IAEA, 2006, p.6]. The IAEA states that government must make 
provision for assigning this legal responsibility to those responsible for the facilities and activities 
[IAEA, 2016, p.5].  
Parameter 6: Suitability for Promoting Optimization of Safety 
Optimization of radiation protection and nuclear safety through the application of the ALARA 
principle is a legal requirement in South Africa as identified in the literature review [DME, 2006, 
s.3.2]. The South African government also states that the NNR is responsible for ensuring efficient 
and cost-effective enforcement of compliance with legal requirements and internationally 
benchmarked regulatory requirements [DME, 2008, pp.19]. The IAEA emphasizes that the regulatory 
process must provide a high degree of confidence that nuclear safety is optimized [IAEA, 2016, p.18].  
Parameter 7: Suitability for Promoting Defence-in-Depth 
Application of defence-in-depth is a legal requirement in South Africa as identified in the literature 





Parameter 8: Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process 
The literature review found that an uncertain and evolving regulatory licensing process contributed 
to cost and schedule overruns during NPP construction in Finland [UNENE, 2014, p.16].  
The IAEA recommends that regulations specify the requirements for all stages of the authorization 
process and for ensuring adequate protection, providing advance information to the operator on the 
requirements for each stage of authorization [IAEA, 2002a, p.4]. 
Suitability for a predictable licensing process is therefore identified as a quality that a regulatory 
approach should promote and a quality having an influence on the optimal regulatory approach.  
Parameter 9: Suitability for Good Governance 
UNENE states that a good regulatory approach defines a climate of openness and fairness [UNENE, 
2014, p.6]. The IAEA states that the regulatory body must foster mutual understanding and 
respectful, open relationships with operating organisations [IAEA, 2016, p.23]. The approach should 
therefore support transparent and fair regulation, resisting corruption and individual bias.  
Suitability for good governance is identified as a quality that a regulatory approach should promote 
and a quality having an influence on the optimal regulatory approach.  
Parameter 10: Suitability for Accommodating a New Build Fleet of Reactors of 
Standardised Technology supported by a Vendor Company  
South Africa aims to implement a fleet approach to PWR procurement [DME, 2008, pp.17, 28]. By 
2030 South Africa will require a nuclear fleet of 9,6 GW of Generation III technology [DOE, 2011, 
p.6]. Eskom will be the procurer for the new build programme [DOE, 2016, s.4]. Eskom will be the 
main owner and operator of the NPPs [DME, 2008, p.23].  
Eskom will contract a vendor to play a major role in the construction of the new build fleet of NPPs.  
Eskom intends on buying a generic NPP that the vendor is already building in another country and 
Eskom aims to secure the rights to build the NPPs itself. [Eskom, 2017]  
This parameter represents a physical element of the nuclear industry that South Africa is aspiring to 
develop; the regulatory approach should be suitable for a fleet of this nature.  
Parameter 11: Suitability for Prototype AHTR Development 
The literature review revealed that Eskom is currently developing first-of-a-kind AHTR technology 
[Reported speech from the Chief Executive Officer of Eskom, personal communication, 2016-03-18]. 
The South African government has a declared intention to pursue a Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
Programme and government supports research, development and innovation in the use of nuclear 
technology [DME, 2008, pp.16, 28]. This parameter represents a physical element of the nuclear 
industry that South Africa is aspiring to develop; the regulatory approach should be suitable for 





Parameter 12: Suitability for International Export of Nuclear SSCs and Services 
The literature review showed that South Africa aims to develop the ability to “market, 
commercialise, sell and export nuclear energy systems and services” [DME, 2008, p.24]. Eskom 
stated that ultimately it aims to secure the rights to export locally manufactured nuclear 
components and entire NPPs in the future [Eskom, 2017]. 
This parameter represents a physical element of the nuclear industry that South Africa is aspiring to 
develop which the regulatory approach should accommodate.  
Parameter 13: Suitability for an Existing, Standard Technology, Aging Reactor 
Koeberg NPP, a standard, commercial, generation II PWR, is currently in its operational phase and is 
intending on entering its life extension operational phase in 2025 [SAR, 2017, p.3]. 
This parameter represents a physical element of South Africa’s current nuclear industry; the 
regulatory approach should be suitable for this existing NPP.  
Parameter 14: Suitability for Promoting International Cooperation 
South Africa, as an IAEA member state, has committed to promote international cooperation to 
enhance the global nuclear safety regime [IAEA, 2016, p.16]. The Convention on Nuclear Safety 
legally commits member states to maintain a high level of safety by setting international 
benchmarks within the nuclear industry [IAEA, 2017]. International cooperation is emphasized in the 
DME’s Nuclear Energy Policy principles [DME, 2008, pp.15-17].  
Parameter 15: Suitability for Promoting Bilateral Cooperation with another 
State 
The 2008 Nuclear Energy Policy for South Africa states that South Africa pursues bilateral 
cooperation with other states that have nuclear programmes from/with which South Africa can 
learn, benefit, transfer technology or export South African nuclear services and manufactured goods 
[DME, 2008, p.20]. For the nuclear new build fleet, Eskom intends on buying a generic NPP from a 
vendor company and on securing the rights to build the NPPs itself and to export locally 
manufactured nuclear components and entire NPPs in the future [Eskom, 2017].  
The IAEA states that the regulatory approach chosen should be informed by the regulatory approach 
implemented in the country from where the nuclear technology is being adopted [IAEA, 2013, p.6].  
This test parameter therefore represents a policy decision taken by the South African government 





4 Test Design 
Following multi-criteria decision making analysis methodology, the identified test parameters are set 
against the available regulatory approach options in a matrix format as shown in the table on the 
following page.  
A three point scale scoring system is selected. Although lacking in discrimination, this scale provides 
more reliable results in terms of attributing the same score to the same stimulus on different 
occasions than a five point scale. [UCT, 2015] The scoring system is utilized to score the suitability of 
each regulatory approach to each test parameter. A zero score indicates relatively poor suitability, a 





Table 1: Design of the Test Matrix 







Parameter 1: Alignment with Internationally Agreed IAEA Safety Standards    
Parameter 2: Financial and Human Resource Suitability    
Parameter 3: Cultural Suitability    
Parameter 4: Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture    
Parameter 5: Suitability for Ensuring Responsibility for Nuclear Safety is Held by those 
Responsible for the Facilities and Activities 
   
Parameter 6: Suitability for Promoting Optimization of Safety    
Parameter 7: Suitability for Promoting Defence-in-Depth    
Parameter 8: Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process    
Parameter 9: Suitability for Good Governance    
Parameter 10: Suitability for Accommodating a New Build Fleet of Reactors of Standardised 
Technology supported by a Vendor Company  
   
Parameter 11: Suitability for Prototype AHTR Development    
Parameter 12: Suitability for International Export of Nuclear SSCs and Services    
Parameter 13: Suitability for an Existing, Standard Technology, Aging Reactor    
Parameter 14: Suitability for Promoting International Cooperation    






5 Test Implementation 
5.1 Scoring the Suitability of each Approach to each Test Parameter 
Addressing each test parameter individually, the suitability of each regulatory approach is 
considered taking into account the South African context. The relative suitability of each regulatory 
approach to the test parameter is discussed considering the strengths, weaknesses, pros and cons of 
the approach and their relevance to the South African context. A basis is developed and used to 
determine the resulting scoring of relative suitability. This section presents the arguments forming 
the basis for the suitability determinations. The resulting scores are also presented. 
Parameter 1: Alignment with Internationally Agreed IAEA Safety Standards 
Goal-setting, performance based and prescriptive regulatory approaches are all referenced in IAEA 
documentation and are used as valid reference examples of regulatory approaches by the IAEA.  
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 2 
Prescriptive approach score: 2 
Parameter 2: Financial and Human Resource Suitability 
NNR funding, insufficient number of staff and insufficient skills capacity are listed as NNR sources of 
concern [NNR, 2017a, pp.17, 21].   
Prescriptive regulations are more resource intensive and difficult to develop and update, requiring 
more detailed and extensive expert knowledge from the regulator [IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. Prescriptive 
regulatory literature is large and complex [IAEA, 2013, p.18]. This approach is poorly suited to the 
South African regulatory body’s situation. 
A performance based regulatory approach allows for fewer and less detailed regulations since the 
regulator prescribes only the basic, high level acceptance criteria. Performance based regulations are 
comparatively easy to develop, low in administrative burden, and have the advantage of not needing 
frequent updates to accommodate new information or technology.  [IAEA, 2002a, p.11] STUK, in its 
performance based approach, sets high level acceptance criteria and does not define any specific 
method to achieve these criteria [IAEA, 2013, p.22]. Determining whether measures put in place by 
the operating organisation are adequate to meet the established acceptance criteria can be 
challenging and requires a high level of professional competence from regulator staff [IAEA, 2011, 
p.32].  
In a goal-setting regulatory approach, the regulator sets safety goals and the licensee must 
demonstrate adequate safety in relation to the safety goal [IAEA, 2013, p.15]. The ONR’s regulatory 





produced by the licensees [ONR, 2016, p.18]. Assessing the adequacy of safety cases requires a high 
level of professional competence from regulator staff. 
The performance based and goal-setting regulatory approaches are assumed to be similar in 
required resource intensity, and to be less resource intensive to the regulator than a prescriptive 
approach. 
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 3: Cultural Suitability 
South Africa’s nuclear safety culture includes strengths such as individuals take personal 
responsibility for safety, continuously learn and keep nuclear safety under constant scrutiny, and 
weaknesses such as poor rule compliance, trust and respect [Eskom, 2017d] [Transparency 
International, 2017] [PMG, 2017]. A highly prescriptive regulatory approach effectively consisting of 
a long list of rules that licensee staff must follow is assumed to be a poor fit with the local culture. A 
goal-setting approach providing licensees flexibility in choosing the manner in which they achieve 
the goals with the regulator judging the extent to which the goals are achieved is presumed to be 
the best fit culturally since licensee staff can take full personal responsibility for safety and gain 
benefit from improving results over time through the application of their strength in continuously 
learning and keeping nuclear safety under constant scrutiny.  The goal-setting approach places the 
responsibility for demonstrating that risks have been reduced ALARP on the licensee. This means 
that the licensee takes full responsibility for determining the measures implemented to ensure 
safety which is a good fit culturally for individuals who take full personal responsibility for safety. A 
performance based approach is assumed to be an adequate fit culturally on the basis that it is a 
more rule based and less flexible approach than the goal-setting approach, but still allows the 
licensee to take personal responsibility for safety and apply continuous learning through the 
flexibility afforded to the licensee in being allowed to set its own specific acceptance criteria and 
methodologies in order to meet the high level acceptance criteria set by the regulator. 
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 






Parameter 4: Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture 
The prescriptive regulatory approach can hinder the development of a strong safety culture in the 
operating organisation [IAEA, 2002a, p.12]. In a prescriptive approach compliance with regulatory 
requirements alone can be deemed to provide the assurance needed for adequate protection [IAEA, 
2013, p.19]. These requirements may not have been optimised for the particular situation which the 
licensee encounters. Focussing primarily on rule compliance does not adequately promote nuclear 
safety culture. Prescriptive regulation is therefore poorly suited to promoting individual nuclear 
safety culture. 
In the goal-setting approach the operating organisation is afforded the flexibility required to be 
innovative and to adopt practices that best meet its particular circumstances, encouraging 
continuous improvement [ONR, 2016, p.17]. Licensees are responsible for demonstrating that they 
have done everything reasonably practicable to reduce risks and must generate safety cases 
providing a comprehensive demonstration of safety [ONR, 2016a, pp.5, 6]. This approach is assumed 
to be well suited to promoting nuclear safety culture, however one contentious point stands out: 
The fundamental requirement is for the licensee to take all measures to reduce risk where doing so 
is reasonable to the point where the costs of any additional measures would be grossly 
disproportionate to the further risk reduction that would be achieved [ONR, 2015, p.11]. While this 
optimizes safety, using a cost/benefit argument to define what safety measures need to be in place 
may not be entirely aligned with promoting nuclear safety culture which emphasizes safety over all 
competing goals to ensure protection.  
A performance based regulatory approach requires a high level of involvement from the operating 
organisation in determining how the regulations will be met encouraging the operating organisation 
to own its overall responsibility for safety, since it is responsible for producing the safety 
demonstrations [IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. Licensees have flexibility to determine how to meet the 
established performance criteria in ways that encourage and reward improved outcomes [US NRC, 
2015]. This approach is assumed to be well suited to promoting nuclear safety culture. 
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 2 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 5: Suitability for Ensuring Responsibility for Nuclear Safety is Held 
by those Responsible for the Facilities and Activities 
A highly prescriptive regulatory approach can shift the burden of proof of safety from the designer 
or operator to the regulator. If the designer or operator is required primarily to follow detailed rules 
set by the regulator and if the regulator misses something, part of the responsibility for safety has 





approach compliance with regulatory requirements in itself can be deemed to provide reasonable 
assurance of adequate protection [IAEA, 2013, p.19]. This approach can lead to a culture of focussing 
only on rule compliance rather than considering safety. A prescriptive approach is considered to be 
poorly suited to this parameter. 
A performance based regulatory approach requires a high level of involvement from the operating 
organisation in determining how the regulations will be met encouraging the operating organisation 
to own its overall responsibility for safety since it is responsible for producing the safety 
demonstrations [IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. STUK sets high level acceptance criteria and the licensee must 
adequately demonstrate to STUK that the requirements have been met [IAEA, 2013, p.14]. While 
this shows good suitability, the inherent weakness is that the regulator sets the high level criteria 
and requirements and is therefore responsible for ensuring that the requirements are not deficient.  
The ONR’s goal-setting approach places the onus on the NPP designer and operator to justify why 
further improvements to all aspects of safety cannot be practicably achieved [UNENE, 2014, p.29]. 
The ONR’s regulatory approach is underpinned by assessing safety cases produced by the licensees 
to provide a comprehensive demonstration of safety [ONR, 2016, p.18]. While this shows good 
suitability, the fact that it is considered acceptable to use a cost/benefit argument to define what 
safety measures need to be in place may remove some level of ultimate responsibility for safety 
from the licensee. Effectively the licensee’s responsibility may be interpreted to be to optimize 
safety financially instead of to be ultimately responsible for safety.    
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 6: Suitability for Promoting Optimization of Safety 
As found by VTT, the prescriptive regulatory approach limits the flexibility of the operating 
organisation in achieving safety. Excessively detailed prescriptive regulatory requirements can inhibit 
engineering innovation and good management initiatives, limiting the licensee’s ability to strive for 
better performance. Safer means and methodologies than those prescribed are discouraged. 
Prescriptive regulations are narrowly applicable and require regular updates to remain current with 
technology and situational changes. Prescriptive regulations not kept up to date can promote old 
technology having a negative effect on safety and economics. [VTT, 2001, s.4.3] This approach is 
poorly suited.  
The flexibility associated with performance based regulations tends to promote continual 
improvement on the part of the operating organisation, as better approaches are constantly sought 
[IAEA, 2002a, p.11]. Performance based regulations provide licensees with flexibility to determine 





outcomes [US NRC, 2015]. STUK allows the licensee full flexibility in determining how specific 
requirements are to be met [IAEA, 2013, p.22]. This allows the licensee to optimize safety but only 
within the constraints set by the regulator’s criteria that are to be achieved.  
The ONR’s goal-setting approach optimizes safety by requiring licensees to implement safety 
measures to the point where the costs of any additional measures would be grossly disproportionate 
to the further risk reduction that would be achieved, demonstrating that they have done everything 
reasonably practicable to reduce risks [ONR, 2015, p.11]. This ensures that outcomes are cost 
effective and without unnecessary burden [ONR, 2016b, p.8]. By allowing a cost/benefit argument to 
determine what safety measures are required, a graded approach to ensuring safety may be 
adopted which optimizes safety by focussing on those things which are more effective.  
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 7: Suitability for Promoting Defence-in-Depth 
Prescriptive regulations, such as those created by the US NRC, were created using a deterministic 
regulatory approach coupled with a defence-in-depth approach. The NRC’s prescriptive regulations 
apply PRA to optimise decision making but the deterministic based and defence-in-depth based 
approaches are maintained as the highest order approaches.  [US NRC, 2010, pp.70-73] Traditional, 
prescriptive regulations are assumed to be highly suited to promoting defence-in-depth.  
The ONR’s goal-setting approach requires licensees to take all measures to reduce risk where doing 
so is reasonably practicable. The onus is on the licensee to implement measures to the point where 
the costs of any additional measures would be grossly disproportionate to the further risk reduction 
that would be achieved. [ONR, 2015, p.11] If it is reasonably practicable to provide a higher standard 
of safety, then the licensee must do so by law [ONR, 2014, p.151]. This approach supports the 
implementation of defence-in-depth but only as far as is reasonably practicable.  
In a performance based approach the licensee sets its own specific acceptance criteria and 
methodologies in order to meet the high level acceptance criteria and thus demonstrate safety. The 
degree to which defence-in-depth is applied depends on how many layers of defence are required to 
achieve the high level acceptance criteria. Defence-in-depth is therefore supported by this approach 
but only to the degree that the high level acceptance criteria demand. 
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 





Parameter 8: Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process 
Prescriptive regulations establish clear requirements and expectations and promote systematic 
interaction between the regulator and other parties [IAEA, 2011, p.32]. They provide the licensee 
with a clear roadmap for compliance [IAEA, 2013, p.26]. Well-defined licensing rules and a high level 
of regulatory certainty and predictability exist. Prescriptive regulations reduce the time and skills 
necessary to perform a licensing review, to grant an authorization or to conduct an inspection since 
verification of compliance is comparatively easy.  [IAEA, 2002a, p.11] This approach is well suited.   
In the performance based approach the regulator sets clear high level criteria that must be met. 
However this approach can sometimes lead to wasted efforts if the operating organisation cannot 
convince the regulator that what was done is adequate to meet the safety criteria [IAEA, 2013, p.32]. 
Although STUK’s performance based regulations allow licensees to propose an alternative procedure 
or solution to that provided for in the regulations, in practice solutions different to those normally 
implemented present a regulatory approval challenge since it may be difficult for the regulator to 
review and approve the associated specific safety case presenting unfamiliar arguments and 
analyses [VTT, 2001 s.3.3]. This shows a basic level of suitability.  
The goal-setting approach, as implemented by ONR, sets clear safety goals and utilizes SAPs 
providing guidance to licensees/applicants. However this approach is subject to the same licensing 
weakness as that of the performance based approach: Solutions different to those normally 
implemented present a regulatory approval challenge due to their specific safety cases presenting 
unfamiliar arguments and analyses. This shows a basic level of suitability. 
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 2 
Parameter 9: Suitability for Good Governance 
Prescriptive regulations are inherently vulnerable to having unclear and non-transparent bases. 
Relative to prescriptive regulation, the NRC has found that performance based regulations can 
improve the objectivity and transparency of regulatory decision making [US NRC, 2002, p.iii].  
STUK’s performance based regulations clearly state the safety limit against which alternative 
solutions developed by the licensee can be judged by the regulator. The regulatory documentation 
aims to specify a safety level to be reached but not give prescriptions for certain solutions to be 
selected over others. [VTT, 2001, ss.3.1, 3.3]  
Similarly the goal-setting approach offers the operating organisation the flexibility required to be 





Setting a clear objective and allowing the operating organisation flexibility in how it attains that 
objective improves the objectivity and transparency of regulatory decision making, supporting good 
governance. However both the goal-setting and the performance based approaches are subject to 
the same weakness in that solutions different to those normally implemented present a regulatory 
approval challenge due to the unfamiliar arguments and analyses presented in the safety cases. This 
can result in a bias towards certain solutions over others. 
The prescriptive approach is less well suited than the goal-setting and performance based 
approaches which both show a reasonable level of suitability to this parameter. 
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 10: Suitability for Accommodating a New Build Fleet of Reactors of 
Standardised Technology supported by a Vendor Company 
The literature review revealed that when regulations differ from international standard practices, 
compliance with the regulations is challenging for international vendors and suppliers. This results in 
difficulty in finding vendors and suppliers willing to make the changes necessary to meet the local 
regulatory requirements, higher prices, re-engineering and re-documentation work and increased 
time durations for supply of SSCs and services.  [VTT, 2001, s.5.2] A prescriptive regulatory approach 
is therefore poorly suited to accommodating the design standards and characteristics utilized by a 
vendor company as is required for the nuclear new build fleet programme.   
A goal-setting approach, as applied by the ONR, is focussed on managing overall risks. In applying 
the SAPs to assess an NPP design, priority is given to achieving an overall balance of safety rather 
than satisfying each principle or making an ALARP judgement against each principle. [ONR, 2016d, 
p.36] This approach focussed on risk management is assumed to provide the greatest flexibility in 
accommodating the specific aspects of the vendor company’s NPP design characteristics. The 
performance based regulatory approach offers less flexibility in accommodating a vendor company’s 
design characteristics since performance based regulations are inherently more specific than the 
goal-setting regulations which are more based on overall risk management. The goal-setting 
approach is therefore better suited to this parameter than the performance based approach.  
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 






Parameter 11: Suitability for Prototype AHTR Development 
Regulating the development of a prototype reactor requires a flexible regulatory approach. Since 
new technology and innovative ideas are being developed, a prescriptive approach is not suitable.   
In researching risk based regulation, it was found that risk based regulation is well suited to first-of-
a-kind nuclear technology development. UNENE states that risk based regulation quantifies and 
prioritises risk leaving major design and operating decisions up to the licensee, who decides how to 
meet the risk goals/requirements. This allows a great deal of flexibility to the licensee, promoting 
innovation and evolution. [UNENE, 2014, p.13] A regulatory approach primarily focussing on risk 
management is assumed to be the approach best suited to affording the flexibility required to 
accommodate the development of innovative technology. A goal-setting approach is considered to 
be best suited to development of a prototype reactor, since this approach is most focussed on risk 
management.  
Considering the attributes of performance based regulations as described in section 2.6.3 
‘Performance Based Regulatory Approach’, it is considered that it would be more challenging to 
utilize a performance based approach for the regulation of the development of a prototype 
advanced reactor.  
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 12: Suitability for International Export of Nuclear SSCs and Services 
As a long term goal, South Africa intends on exporting NPP SSCs and services [DME, 2008, p.24]. In 
order to export successfully, account needs to be taken of the international regulatory requirements 
for the technology being exported. In order to export nuclear technology, it will need to be accepted 
by the importing country’s nuclear safety regulator. To maximise the likelihood of a country’s 
regulator accepting South Africa’s NPP SSCs and services in the future, account should be taken of 
international trends in regulatory approaches.  In this regard the literature review revealed that 
regulation through risk management with numerical risk goals facilitated by the application of PRA is 
an increasing global trend in nuclear safety regulation. Elements of regulation through risk 
management, applied to differing degrees, were identified in all three regulatory approaches under 
consideration making PRA a regulatory common ground regardless of the chosen regulatory 
approach. The common element identified was the application of PRA to identify, quantify and 
prioritise risks. All three regulatory approaches under consideration use risk insights to influence 
regulatory decision making.  The three approaches differ in the degree to which they apply and rely 
on regulation through risk management. The goal-setting approach uses risk management as the 





regulation through risk management using PRA to support its performance based regulatory 
approach. The US NRC’s prescriptive approach applies risk insights provided by PRA to its primarily 
deterministic and defence-in-depth based approach. 
The scoring for this parameter is based on the degree to which the approaches apply PRA and risk 
based regulation since the literature review identified this as a global common ground in regulation 
and since the literature review identified the global trend of the increasing level of use of PRA in 
regulatory approaches over time.  
Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 13: Suitability for an Existing, Standard Technology, Aging Reactor 
Koeberg NPP has been in operation since 1984. It is operated by a mature organisation with an 
established nuclear safety culture.  
The design basis of Koeberg NPP is based on deterministic analysis and defence-in-depth 
considerations with limited application of risk insights. The design basis of an NPP must be 
maintained to ensure overall integrity of the NPP, though enhancements can and should be made 
over time. The regulatory approach applied should ensure the maintenance of the plant’s 
deterministic analysis and defence-in-depth basis. A prescriptive approach is best suited to 
maintaining these elements of the NPP’s design basis. 
Koeberg NPP has a substantial performance history which would allow for the development of 
performance based regulations based on the NPP’s performance history. Monitoring performance is 
an important part of regulating a mature NPP. Continuous improvement can be driven through 
performance management. Trending performance over time can be used to identify any 
performance degradation which would be a key indicator to flag the need for regulatory 
intervention. A mature NPP is thus well suited to a performance based regulatory approach. 
As lessons are learned over time and as technology progresses, it is an industry wide expectation 
that NPPs improve their levels of safety through design modifications and various safety 
enhancements. PRA has improved greatly since Koeberg NPP was designed. Modern PRA is and 
should be applied to the existing NPP to identify areas for improvement and to ensure that the 
overall levels of risk posed by the NPP are acceptable according to modern standards. Risk insights 
gained from modern PRA methods provide important insight into safety enhancements that can and 
should be implemented. In addition, risk management applying the ALARP principle can enhance the 
overall safety of the installation in a financially optimized manner. The goal-setting regulatory 





important part of regulating a mature NPP in order to bring it into alignment with modern safety 
standards in a cost effective manner.  
Aspects of all three regulatory approaches are applicable to a mature NPP like Koeberg and can add 
value when incorporated into the regulatory approach applied. A mixed approach to regulation is 
therefore suitable for a mature NPP.  
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 1 
Parameter 14: Suitability for Promoting International Cooperation 
One of the reasons why international cooperation is important is when regulations differ from 
international standard practices, compliance with the regulations is challenging for international 
vendors and suppliers. This, as previously discussed, results in difficulty in finding vendors and 
suppliers willing to make the changes necessary to meet the local regulatory requirements, higher 
prices, re-engineering and re-documentation work and increased time durations for supply of SSCs 
and services.  [VTT, 2001, s.5.2]  
As described for parameter 12, the literature review did identify a common element to all three 
regulatory approaches under consideration: The application of PRA to identify, quantify and 
prioritise risks and to use risk insights to influence regulatory decision making. The three approaches 
differ in the degree to which they apply and rely on regulation through risk management. The goal-
setting approach uses risk management as the primary mode of regulation. Performance based 
regulation, as applied by STUK, utilizes regulation through risk management using PRA to support its 
performance based regulatory approach. The US NRC’s prescriptive approach applies risk insights 
provided by PRA to its primarily deterministic and defence-in-depth based prescriptive approach. 
The literature review identified the global trend of the increasing level of use of PRA in regulatory 
approaches over time. An important element of international cooperation is performing 
international benchmarking and comparisons. This is well facilitated through the use of PRA since 
PRA is a regulatory common ground irrespective of the country’s regulatory approach.  In addition 
regulation through risk management utilizing PRA to provide risk insights best accommodates 
differing approaches to nuclear safety by providing licensees/applicants with the most flexibility in 
the manner in which they can achieve regulatory objectives. The scoring for this parameter is 








Goal-setting approach score: 2 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 0 
Parameter 15: Suitability for Promoting Bilateral Cooperation with another 
State 
South Africa pursues bilateral cooperation with other states to further various objectives for its 
domestic nuclear industry [DME, 2008, p.20].  
For the required nuclear new build fleet of 9,6 GW [DOE, 2011, p.6], Eskom has declared its intention 
to buy a generic NPP from a vendor company and to secure the rights to build and export these NPPs 
or parts thereof [Eskom, 2017].   
Bilateral cooperation between South Africa and the country of the vendor company providing the 
new build fleet is judged to be the most important and influential state level bilateral cooperation 
aimed to be established within the scope of South Africa’s nuclear power generation industry plans. 
Consideration of this particular bilateral cooperation between South Africa and the fleet vendor 
country therefore dominates the scoring for parameter 15.  
Strategic alignment of South Africa’s regulatory approach with the vendor country’s regulatory 
approach would promote this bilateral cooperation between the two states.  
South Africa’s regulatory approach may be chosen to align with the regulatory approach 
implemented in the vendor company’s country of origin. This would reduce the risk of local 
regulatory requirements necessitating that the vendor make changes to their NPP design, resulting 
in a cost benefit by minimizing re-engineering and re-documentation work and resulting in reduced 
time durations for supply of SSCs and services from the vendor company. 
In addition, aligning South Africa’s nuclear safety regulatory approach with the vendor country’s 
approach would provide the benefit of the vendor country’s regulator being able to fully support the 
NNR in developing and implementing its regulatory system for South Africa’s nuclear industry 
expansion. The NNR would therefore have the support of a more experienced regulatory body and 
have expert assistance in developing and applying its regulatory system.  
This possibility is supported by the IAEA recommendation that the regulatory approach chosen be 
informed by the regulatory approach implemented in the country from where the nuclear 
technology is being adopted [IAEA, 2013, p.6]. As summarized in section 2.6.1 ‘Introduction to 
Nuclear Safety Regulation Systems’, the IAEA describes many benefits that can be gained from a 





It is not yet known who the fleet vendor company will be. The required information is thus not yet 
available to score the relative suitability of the regulatory approaches to the South African context. 
All three approaches are therefore allocated the same score since there is no basis currently 
available for differentiating between the suitability of the three approaches.   
Goal-setting approach score: 1 
Performance based approach score: 1 
Prescriptive approach score: 1 
 
5.2 Test Matrix Population 
The scores determined in Section 5.1 ‘Scoring the Suitability of each Approach to each Test 
Parameter’ are transcribed into the test matrix developed in Chapter 4 ‘Test Design’. The resulting 





Table 2: Populated Test Matrix 







Parameter 1: Alignment with Internationally Agreed IAEA Safety Standards 2 2 2 
Parameter 2: Financial and Human Resource Suitability 1 1 0 
Parameter 3: Cultural Suitability 2 1 0 
Parameter 4: Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture 1 2 0 
Parameter 5: Suitability for Ensuring Responsibility for Nuclear Safety is Held by those 
Responsible for the Facilities and Activities 
1 1 0 
Parameter 6: Suitability for Promoting Optimization of Safety 2 1 0 
Parameter 7: Suitability for Promoting Defence-in-Depth 1 1 2 
Parameter 8: Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process 1 1 2 
Parameter 9: Suitability for Good Governance 1 1 0 
Parameter 10: Suitability for Accommodating a New Build Fleet of Reactors of Standardised 
Technology supported by a Vendor Company  
2 1 0 
Parameter 11: Suitability for Prototype AHTR Development 2 1 0 
Parameter 12: Suitability for International Export of Nuclear SSCs and Services 2 1 0 
Parameter 13: Suitability for an Existing, Standard Technology, Aging Reactor 1 1 1 
Parameter 14: Suitability for Promoting International Cooperation 2 1 0 





6 Test Results, Interpretation and Discussion 
The overall test results are determined for each nuclear safety regulatory approach by summing the 
scores allocated to that approach for each test parameter. The results are as follows: 
Goal-setting approach total score: 22 
Performance based approach total score: 17 
Prescriptive approach total score: 8 
Based on the information currently available, the multi-criteria decision making analysis process 
utilized to systematically compare the alternative regulatory approaches has revealed that the goal-
setting approach stands out as the nuclear safety regulatory approach best suited to the South 
African context. Performance based nuclear safety regulation is less well suited and a prescriptive 
approach to nuclear safety regulation is poorly suited to the South African context.  
It is important to check whether test parameters of lower importance are disproportionally biasing 
the results. It is also important to check whether ranking and weighting of the test parameters may 
change the outcome of the analysis and suggest that a different approach to nuclear safety 
regulation may be optimal for South Africa.  
Assessment of the individual test parameter scores shows that the performance based regulatory 
approach was allocated a higher score than the goal-setting regulatory approach for only one out of 
fifteen test parameters, namely Parameter 4: ‘Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture’. 
Parameter 4 is not considered to be relatively more important than most of the remaining fourteen 
test parameters, so it is not considered plausible that ranking and weighting of the test parameters 
can change the overall outcome of the analysis on the basis of the performance based approach 
being better suited to promoting nuclear safety culture than the goal-setting approach. Parameter 4 
however represents a legal requirement in South Africa so it is important to check whether the goal-
setting approach has at least a basic level of suitability to this parameter. The test result shows that 
a score of 1 was allocated; the goal-setting approach does have a basic level of suitability to 
parameter 4.  By any reasonable ranking and weighting exercise, the importance of Parameter 4: 
‘Suitability for Promoting Nuclear Safety Culture’ cannot be made large enough to make the 
performance based approach better suited to South Africa than the goal-setting approach.   
The prescriptive regulatory approach was allocated a higher score than the goal-setting regulatory 
approach for two of the fifteen test parameters, namely Parameter 7: ‘Suitability for Promoting 
Defence-in-Depth’ and Parameter 8: ‘Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process’. Again, 
parameters 7 and 8 are not considered to be relatively more important than most of the remaining 
thirteen test parameters so it is not considered plausible that ranking and weighting of the test 
parameters can change the overall outcome of the analysis on the basis of the prescriptive approach 





setting approach. Parameter 7 however also represents a legal requirement in South Africa so it is 
important to check whether the goal-setting approach has at least a basic level of suitability to this 
parameter. The test result shows that a score of 1 was allocated; the goal-setting approach does 
have a basic level of suitability to parameter 7.  By any reasonable ranking and weighting exercise, 
the importance of Parameter 7: ‘Suitability for Promoting Defence-in-Depth’ and Parameter 8: 
‘Suitability for a Predictable Licensing Process’ cannot be made large enough to make the 
prescriptive approach better suited to South Africa than the goal-setting approach.   
This assessment of the test matrix results shows that test parameters of lower importance are not 
disproportionally biasing the overall result. The assessment of the test results has also shown that 
reasonable ranking and weighting of the test parameters to take into account the relative 
importance of the test parameters will not change the overall result: Based on the information 
currently available, the goal-setting approach to nuclear safety regulation has been revealed as the 
optimal approach for South Africa’s planned nuclear industry. 
The goal-setting regulatory approach is found to be well suited to the South African nuclear safety 
culture and to offer the most flexibility in allowing applicants or licensees to achieve high standards 
of safety in a manner of their own choosing. This promotes cost effective regulation, optimization of 
safety, innovation, transparent regulation, good governance and international cooperation and 
benchmarking. The goal-setting approach, providing the highest level of flexibility to the licensee or 
applicant on the manner in which it achieves safety goals, is found to be best suited to 
accommodating international vendors as is required for the nuclear new build fleet, to promoting 
the innovation necessary for prototype advanced reactor development and to supporting 
international export of nuclear SSCs and services.  
However correct interpretation of the potential impact of Parameter 15: ‘Suitability for Promoting 
Bilateral Cooperation with another State’ is essential. The score of 1 has been attributed to each of 
the three regulatory approaches due to the fact that there is currently no basis available for 
differentiating between the suitability of the three approaches for this parameter. The vendor 
company for the 9,6 GW nuclear new build programme is not yet known. But this single parameter, 
representing state level bilateral cooperation between South Africa and the country of origin of the 
vendor company providing the nuclear fleet, may alone drive the determination of the optimal 
regulatory approach for South Africa. An important part of bilateral cooperation between these two 
states is bilateral cooperation between both states’ regulatory bodies. Establishing bilateral 
cooperation between the NNR and the regulatory body of the vendor company’s country of origin 
can be best facilitated by the NNR aligning its regulatory approach to that of the regulatory body of 
the vendor company’s country. This could provide a number of benefits leading to optimization of 
South Africa’s regulatory approach.  Aligning the regulatory approaches would minimize the efforts 
required by the NNR to develop and implement its nuclear safety regulation system since it will have 
the support of the more experienced regulatory body from the vendor company’s country. Aligning 





to its NPP design to meet local regulations. As summarized in section 2.6.1 ‘Introduction to Nuclear 
Safety Regulation Systems’, the IAEA describes many benefits that can be gained from a strong 
cooperation between the regulator and the regulatory body of the vendor state. This cooperation 
can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulation of South Africa’s planned nuclear 
industry. These factors would have cost, quality and time benefits in terms of development and 
implementation of the South African nuclear safety regulatory system and the nuclear new build 
fleet implementation.   
The NNR aligning its regulatory approach with that of the regulatory body of the vendor company’s 
country of origin is, in principle, supported by the IAEA which recommends that the regulatory 
approach chosen should be informed by the approach implemented in the country from where the 







This dissertation tested the hypothesis that the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South 
Africa’s planned nuclear industry can already be determined by systematically comparing the 
suitability of various alternatives in use in the international nuclear industry.  
The literature review identified three main nuclear safety regulatory approaches applied in the 
international nuclear industry and endorsed by the IAEA. These are the goal-setting, performance 
based and prescriptive approaches. These three approaches are considered to be the options 
available for the nuclear safety regulatory approaches that may be implemented in South Africa to 
accommodate the planned nuclear industry expansion. These approaches may be enhanced and 
supported by process based and risk based methodologies.  A test was developed and conducted to 
systematically compare the relative suitability of these three approaches utilizing multi-criteria 
decision making analysis in order to identify the optimal approach for regulating the nuclear safety 
of the planned nuclear industry in South Africa.  Based on the information currently available, this 
test reveals that the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for the planned South African 
nuclear industry is the goal-setting approach.  
Systematic comparison of the three approaches reveals that the goal-setting nuclear safety 
regulatory approach best facilitates South Africa achieving its nuclear aspirations.  This cost-effective 
regulatory approach is based on risk management, with regulation aimed at implementing the 
requirement for risks to be reduced as low as reasonably practicable through the application of set 
numerical risk goals. This approach is found to offer the most flexibility in allowing licensees or 
applicants to achieve high standards of safety in a manner of their own choosing. This promotes 
optimization of safety, innovation, transparent regulation, good governance and international 
cooperation and benchmarking. This approach is well suited to South African culture. The flexibility it 
affords licensees or applicants best accommodates South Africa making use of international vendors 
and best supports the innovation required for prototype advanced reactor development.  
Regulation through risk management with numerical risk goals facilitated by the application of PRA 
was identified as an increasing global trend in nuclear safety regulation. Elements of regulation 
through risk management, applied to differing degrees, were identified in all three regulatory 
approaches considered, making PRA a regulatory common ground regardless of the chosen 
regulatory approach. The goal-setting regulatory approach which is most focussed on regulation 
through risk management therefore best supports international cooperation and best 
accommodates differing approaches to nuclear safety. Considering trends over time and the 
importance of international cooperation, this approach best suits South Africa’s long term goal of 
exporting of NPP SSCs and services. 
In applying its optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach, that is a goal-setting approach, South 
Africa would stand to benefit in numerous ways. South Africa’s financial and human resources would 





more resource intensive regulatory system. Human performance would be optimized since 
individuals would be working in a system well suited to South African culture and within a system 
that encourages individuals to take ownership of their personal responsibility for safety and high 
performance. Nuclear safety would be optimized since the regulatory system would be 
accommodating of alternative, innovative and modern safety related solutions and would encourage 
continual improvement. Governance could be improved since the regulatory system would be based 
on transparent, objective requirements with clear bases that do not favour certain solutions over 
others. South Africa would further benefit from application of its optimal regulatory approach since 
this flexible, non-prescriptive approach would accommodate more potential international vendors 
and suppliers, providing more options and more competitive pricing. Many benefits of applying an 
optimised regulatory approach have been identified.  
While the test performed shows that the goal setting regulatory approach is the best suited to the 
South African context, one crucial research finding reveals the hypothesis of this dissertation to be 
false.   
The South African government pursues state level bilateral cooperation between South Africa and 
the country of origin of the vendor company providing the 9,6 GW nuclear new build fleet. It is not 
yet known who the vendor company will be. This state level bilateral cooperation may well extend to 
bilateral cooperation between the NNR and the regulatory body of the vendor country which would 
be well facilitated by alignment of their regulatory approaches. Indeed, the IAEA recommends that 
the regulator implement a cooperation programme most importantly with the regulator of the 
vendor state. The IAEA cautions that this could influence the intended regulatory approach 
tentatively planned before the vendor was selected.  [IAEA, 2011, pp.21, 35] Alignment of South 
Africa’s regulatory approach with the regulatory approach implemented in the vendor’s country may 
greatly optimize nuclear safety regulation in South Africa. The IAEA provides numerous examples of 
benefits that can be gained through cooperation with the vendor state’s regulatory body [IAEA, 
2011, p. 35], and cautions that in order to optimize regulation, the regulatory approach planned 
before the vendor was selected may have to be altered depending on the regulatory approach 
implemented in the selected vendor country [IAEA, 2013, p.6] [IAEA, 2011, p. 35].  
 Subsequent to the fleet vendor selection, the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South 
Africa may therefore change to being the regulatory approach implemented in the country of origin 
of the fleet vendor company.  
In the interim and in the event of South Africa not proceeding with strategic alignment of regulatory 
approaches for the planned new build fleet, the research findings and test results have an important 
implication: The goal-setting approach is the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South 
Africa’s nuclear industry. Applying the goal-setting approach as the dominant nuclear safety 





The hypothesis of this dissertation has been shown to be false. The optimal nuclear safety regulatory 
approach for South Africa’s planned nuclear industry cannot already be determined by 
systematically comparing the suitability of various alternatives in use in the international nuclear 






8 Implications of the Research Findings 
Selection of the vendor company for the 9,6 GW nuclear new build fleet may change the optimal 
nuclear safety regulatory approach for South Africa’s planned nuclear industry. Conclusions on the 
optimal approach for South Africa cannot be drawn until after this selection is made. Reassessment 
of the optimal nuclear safety regulatory approach for South Africa’s nuclear industry is required 
once the fleet vendor company is known and information is available on the nuclear safety 
regulatory system applied in the vendor company’s country of origin. 
In the interim and in the event that strategic regulatory alignment for the new build fleet is not 
embarked upon, the research findings and test results have important implications for South Africa’s 
nuclear industry.  
The test results show that, in the interim and in the absence of a strategic alignment of regulatory 
approaches for the new build fleet, the goal-setting regulatory approach is the optimal nuclear 
safety regulatory approach for South Africa. The test results show that applying the goal-setting 
approach as the dominant nuclear safety regulatory approach can optimize South Africa’s nuclear 
safety regulation.  
Concerning Koeberg NPP specifically, the research findings show that aspects of all three regulatory 
approaches, goal-setting, performance based and prescriptive, are applicable to a mature NPP like 
Koeberg and can add value when incorporated into the regulatory approach applied. The mixed 
regulatory approach which is currently applied at Koeberg NPP is therefore well suited to regulating 
its nuclear safety, though applying goal-setting regulation as the dominant approach can optimize its 
nuclear safety regulation by best facilitating identification of safety enhancements and alignment 
with modern safety standards in a cost effective manner. 
In regulating the development of a prototype advanced nuclear reactor, the research findings show 
that a goal-setting nuclear safety regulatory approach is best suited to providing the flexibility 
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